The Social Contract

Vol. X, No. 3 Spring 2000

Highlights

Mariel boatlift - after twenty years the impact on Miami and South Florida.

AFL-CIO leadership switches sides in the battle for American jobs.

Immigration numbers never seem to be part of the population problem.

Independence: Let Puerto Rico to go its own way.

One teacher counsels another about discussing immigration and population growth with their young students.

Wayne Lutton argues that there is no high-tech labor shortage.

Maria Chang revisits the issue of Aztlan - the reconquest of the American Southwest.

Four books are reviewed including Leon Bouvier's *World Population: Challenges for the 21st Century.*

Revised Projections

Census Bureau Report Foreshadows a More Crowded and Balkanized U.S.



Geographer Lee Madland surveys ethnic strife around the globe. See p. 161

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About The Social Contract

The English philosopher John Locke, whose thinking helped inspire the American revolution, said that society should be governed by an understood set of values he termed "the social contract." Under the social contract, governments have obligations to their citizens, and citizens have responsibilities to society.

Most great public issues are basically moral and ethical ones. What is the right thing to do? How do we decide what we think is right? When "rights" collide, which ones take precedence? The concept of the social contract helps us sort out the difficult issues confronting American society today and helps us find balance.

Each quarter, The Social Contract *journal examines trends, events and ideas that could unravel America's delicate social fabric. Key topics addressed by this journal:*

- *Human population issues, including absolute size, rate of growth and distribution. Do cherished American ideals prosper or suffer through further population growth?*
- *Immigration issues. In order to best facilitate meeting the highest goals of the American people, (1) how many immigrants should we admit? (2) who should be admitted, and (3) how can we humanely enforce the rules?*
- *Language, assimilation, culture and national unity considerations. What are the shared values necessary to the maintenance of our social contract?*
- *The balance of individual rights and civic responsibilities. Since the previous issues are so often framed in terms of rights, what are the balancing obligations?*
- *Other nations' efforts at guarding or creating their own social contracts. What practical insight can be gained from observing the failures and successes in nation-building by other societies?*

The Social Contract *explores these complex and interrelated issues with articles varying greatly in outlook and philosophy in the attempt to further vigorous public debate.*

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

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A Note from the Editor: Mariel—20 Years On

An aspect of the Elian Gonzalez case noted by only a few observers is how much it widened Miami's ethnic divide. A majority of Americans favored reuniting Elian with his father. Ninety-two percent of blacks and 76 percent of non-Hispanic whites told pollsters Elian deserved to be with his father even if that meant return to Cuba. Eighty-three percent of Cuban Americans said he should remain in the U.S., as did 55 percent of other Hispanics. Miami civic activist Dan Ricker observed, "There is a 10-mile fissure in this community and it's getting wider." Florida International University professor Antonio Jorge noted that efforts to promote racial and ethnic cooperation have failed: "The Elian case is direct evidence that we don't understand each other. It will affect the quality of life in this community for years to come."

The loss of Miami's sense of community is just one of the consequences of the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, which, along with succeeding waves of Haitian and Nicaraguan immigration, led to the fragmentation of South Florida. Native Miamians fled north as "acculturation in reverse" took place, with Cubans and other immigrant groups reproducing their institutions in what had once been the American Riviera, long home to a large population of retirees and veterans, joined by tourists during the sunny winters.

For those who may have forgotten, or are not acquainted with, the chain of events that helped trigger the transformation of Miami, the following outline of events may be instructive.

On April 1, 1980, a bus driver, José Antonio Rodriguez Gallegos, drove his minibus through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana, and asked for political asylum. After a Cuban guard was killed, Fidel Castro withdrew police protection from the embassy and over 10,000 Cubans from across the island stormed the embassy grounds, demanding asylum.

Castro then opened the port of Mariel, declaring that anyone wishing to leave Cuba could do so. He invited exiles in the U.S. to come pick up their relatives. The first boats arrived at Key West on April 20, in what became known as the "Freedom Flotilla."

The Carter Administration, fearful of alienating Cuban-American voters, refused to control the exodus. On May 5, 1980, President Carter welcomed those leaving Cuba with "an open heart and open arms." The following day, Carter declared a state of emergency in Florida and sent U.S. marshals and marines to South Florida to confront the flow.

On June 17, Carter asked Congress to appropriate $385 million for Cuban refugee programs and on June 20, the President granted a special six-month "entrant" status to newly arrived Cubans and Haitians, permitting them to work and qualify for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicaid, and other assistance programs.

Florida officials, including Miami Mayor Maurice Ferre, urged that the flow of refugees be diverted elsewhere, preferably to other Latin American countries, such as Peru and Costa Rica, but in the end nothing was done to discourage them from settling in South Florida. Jack Watson, Carter's Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs, explained the decision to admit the illegal Cubans: "We decided that it would be

MARIEL BY THE NUMBERS

125,266 refugees in 5 months by way of 2,011 vessels.
26 people died (many on overloaded boats; 14 on May 17 when one boat sank near the coast of Cuba.
336 people were indicted for aiding illegal immigration (after the U.S. decided to stop the flow in May; later dismissed).
At the peak of boatlift, 2,800 arrived daily. The most to arrive in one day: 6,000 on June 3rd.

CUBAN IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S.

Before 1950	16,406	1975-1979	33,256
1950-1959	50,956	1980-1981	125,313
1960-1964	174,275	1982-1984	23,163
1965-1969	173,287	1985-1986	16,963
1970-1974	109,731	1987-1990	33,837

Sources: 1990 US Census; Origins and Destinies by Silvia Pedraza and Ruben Rumbaut. (—*Miami Herald*, 4-18-2000)

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counter-productive to enforce the laws."

Cuba closed Mariel harbor to U.S.-bound emigrants on September 26, 1980. Over the course of 159 days, some 125,000 new refugees arrived in the U.S.

It soon became clear that few of the *Marielitos* were fleeing persecution because of their political or religious views, their social class or their race. Many were common criminals and asocials who had heard of, or even seen, the prosperity of the Cubans already living in the U.S. (In the late 1970s, Castro allowed some Cuban Americans to visit Cuba.) Said Enrique Torres, a Havana auto mechanic: "Seeing all those watches and good clothing—it blew people's minds."

By mid-September of 1980, the tide of Caribbean immigrants had put its mark on Miami: a crime wave swept Little Havana; robberies increased 775 percent over 1979; there were 284 percent more car thefts; 191 percent more burglaries; 110 percent more assaults. As the Cuban-born head of a City of Miami social service agency admitted during a 1983 interview, "The quality of Cuban refugees who arrived in the seventies is very different from those who came in 1980. About a third of the 125,000 *Marielitos* are trash—delinquents, homosexuals. Their effects on Miami have been terrible."

Abandoned by official Washington, Miami's natives were forced to flee. The "Mariel Experience" has become institutionalized. Immigration laws are not enforced. The interests and wishes of American citizens are not respected. The notion that immigrants should assimilate to American values has been replaced by the demand that Americans adapt to uninvited newcomers. What happened to Miami is now being repeated in other communities across the country, from Siler City, North Carolina, and Wassau, Wisconsin to Minneapolis, Minnesota. Illegal immigrants and "refugees" have been allowed to arrive in undigestible numbers and practically take over several states in the American Southwest and Pacific coast.

Immigration will shape the U.S. in the 21st century. The great challenge is to see that "America" is not reduced to a mere geographic expression for a territory inhabited by conflicting peoples, who had long before lost any real sense of nationality.

WAYNE LUTTON, Ph.D., Editor

Letter to the Editor

EDITOR:

Our values remain hidden in plain view until they are illuminated.

Thank you, John Attarian, for adding a new word to our vocabulary. "Economism" says it all. Your article in the Winter, 19899-2000, *Social Contract* speaks to essential values. When we allow ourselves to become possessed by our possessions and consumed by our consumption, then the system we have fashioned makes sense. Liveable communities, national sovereignty, autonomy, identity and culture become casualties to the not-so-visible hand of economism.

Even the civic realm bespeaks of economism. Architecturally uneventful buildings loom at the distant vista of parking lagoons. They are designed to promote mass consumption, but they do nothing to instill a cherished sense of place. Turning a child loose in the parking lot has become a form of child abuse. Box-like structures have come to replace historic communities. We thought the town was built for the ages. The design of life is now set by the term of the mortgage. You have enabled us to visualize how the operative values affect our daily lives.

But you conclude by stating: "It follows from all this that the best economic system is one which provides widespread opportunity for men to support families, enabling mothers to stay home, rear the children, supervise their activities, and see to their soulcraft."

Admittedly it follows from all this that we need to nurture values to build strong families. Cementing a woman to the homefront will no longer accomplish these objectives today. Economism becomes a good rationale for extended maternity leave. But turning back the clock on feminism will cause your far more important message to be ignored by your potential audience.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN F. ROHE Petoskey, Michigan

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Immigration, Ethnic Strife, Nations — And America

A global survey

by Lee G. Madland

The United States of America in recent decades, particularly its political and cultural elite, has exhibited a peculiar blind spot concerning likely consequences of heavy immigration of peoples from widely dissimilar cultures, specifically the wave unleashed by the 1965 Immigration Act which in the historical eyeblink of just thirty years since it effectively took off around 1970, has markedly changed the makeup of the country. In a single generation it has reduced the country's historic European-descended majority from 88 percent to hardly over 70 percent.[1] Unless major legal changes take place, that founding majority may well become a minority within a half-century from now.

Geographer Madland takes his readers for a comprehensive survey of ethnic conflicts around the world and then asks if the United States is not receiving immigrants at a rate that precludes assimilation into the American culture.

Some hopefully, or dutifully, declare this not to be a problem. Immigration is an issue that splits both conservatives and liberals, both Democrats and Republicans. But most of their leaders, afraid of being denounced as racist or worse, cannot bring themselves to oppose the present permissive "open borders" policies which continue to bring in massive numbers of both legal and illegal immigrants — despite public opinion surveys that consistently show considerable majorities favoring immigration reduction, often even among major immigrant groups themselves.

***Lee G. Madland, Ph.D.**, is currently a consultant in Missoula, Montana. His doctorate in geography is from Stanford University and he has taught at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas.*

Ethnicity matters. Nationality matters. The term "ethnic" is often misunderstood by those who think of it primarily in terms of bloodlines. But physical ancestry is only part. Even more importantly it refers to culture, which in myriad ways — both conscious and subliminal — affects how people see and do things. Without doubt the key single aspect and indicator of a region's culture, of cohesive groups, is *language*, which, after all, is the basic means of human communication beyond the very simplest levels. And language is a carrier not only of information, but, inherently, of values. Religion can also be a potent factor in ethnicity, in some societies more than others. A sense of common history is yet another binding element. The rest, including a group's customary mores and folkways, are less easily defined as they are often subjective — but all are intertwined with language, ancestry, religion, and history, reinforcing their status as the major identifiers of ethnic groups around the world.

From small to large, cohesive groups range from family, clan, tribe, to nation. The term *nation* does not denote a sovereign political unit with official boundaries, although many, especially Americans, carelessly or unknowingly use it to mean exactly that. The territories of independent *states* often fail to match those of nations — in fact the two are sometimes wildly different — which has brought tragic consequences in all parts of the world and in all periods of history. A state peopled by a nationality effectively matched with its territory is called a *nation-state.* To avoid confusion we shall here use the

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word *country* to denote a sovereign state and its territory, whatever its ethnic or national components may be. A nation, then, is *a cohesive group of people with a sense of shared identity.* It is the largest group that effectively shares it. Not everyone need be genetically related. But always, it speaks one language.

This comes down to one overwhelming fact: people prefer to live and deal with their own kind, in their own culture. This has always been true — everywhere. No amount of Politically Correct posturing or celebrating of diversity has ever changed this fact of human nature. Note that while ethnicity may involve racial and other visible characteristics, this is not always or necessarily the case, and certainly does not explain all. A feeling of ethnic or national identity can cross racial and descent lines, if the prevailing culture is healthy and confident. Multiethnic, multicultural, multinational societies strongly tend to split apart, though on the surface they may be held together for some time by a strong, often repressively authoritarian regime. During a buildup of ethnic tensions many people, though perhaps growing increasingly uneasy in a vague way, are often unaware of the significance of events taking place before their eyes.

"There have not been many wars in this century whose origins do not include interethnic hostility in some form..."
— Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 1992

The ethnic-cultural makeup of a country greatly impacts all aspects of a society's life: social, economic, political, and often physical (war!). As Adam Roberts of Oxford, in his foreword to a book by U.S. Senator Moynihan, remarked in 1992: "There have not been many wars in this century whose origins do not include interethnic hostility in some form, and the failure of national boundaries to reflect ancient or modern ethnic realities." And Moynihan: "World War II was as much pogrom as anything else, and far the greatest incidence of violence since has been ethnic in nature and origin."[2]

As an overview of what not only can happen but often has, let's look at specific instances around the world just since the Vietnam War period, a span of hardly over a generation and the time of history we are all familiar with. Our focus is on countries with ethnic conflicts, separatism, or visible potential for such.

In the many cases where major bloodshed has occurred, a useful "handle" to bring home to Americans the human costs involved is to compare available casualty figures with those of U.S. wars, in terms of deaths in the armed forces as a proportion of the country's entire population when the war began. By this measure the costliest wars America has fought were:[3]

1) THE CIVIL WAR 1861-1865 (4 years): Total for both sides, 498,000 deaths. The most searing conflict in America's history, directly taking the lives of *1 in 65* Americans, the proportion of each population similar for both Union and Confederate forces.

2) WORLD WAR II, 1941-1945 (3 years, 8 months): 407,000 deaths, *1 in 330* Americans.

3) THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, 1775-1781 (6 years, 7 months) 4,435 deaths (in battle only), *1 in 560* Americans.

4) WORLD WAR I, 1917-1918 (1 year, 7 months): 117,000 deaths, *1 in 875* Americans.

5) VIETNAM WAR, 1964-1973 (8 years, 6 months): 58,000 deaths, *1 in 3200* Americans.

6) Other conflicts: War of 1812 (*1 in 3300),* Korean (*1 in 4100*), Mexican (*1 in 13,000*), Spanish-American (*1 in 30,000*).

In making comparisons, it should also be noted that in all American wars after the Civil War there were no American refugees, since those wars were fought outside American territory. In the examples that follow, refugees often number many times those killed, adding further dimensions to the human cost. With this in mind, we now start our survey of countries with recent ethnic tensions and conflicts.

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Europe

Some European countries are relatively homogeneous, in part as a result of earlier conflicts and border changes, but some are not. The most serious ethnic eruptions in recent years have come about in the wake of the collapse and breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1991, but troubles have occurred elsewhere as well. We start with Western Europe, relatively tranquil since the end of World War II.

Northern Ireland: Ulster Protestants ("Scots-Irish" descended from Scots settlers planted in the 1600s) are two-thirds of the population, Irish Catholics one-third. Partisans of the latter wish to unite the [province with the Irish Republic, the former to remain under British sovereignty. Terrorist violence on both sides has killed over 3,000 since 1969 (or *1 in 500* of its population). The 1998 political accord remains shaky.

In *Great Britain* itself there is an independence movement among an apparently growing minority in *Scotland*, and a smaller less-organized one in *Wales*.

Belgium is split along its middle between the Dutch-speaking *Flemings* in the North and *Walloon French* in the South. A Flemish separatist party is active. Ethnic tension has periodically erupted in demonstrations and has produced separate institutions.

France is mostly French, except in a few peripheral regions such as *Brittany* (Celtic) and *Alsace* (German), where there have been few problems recently. But on the island of *Corsica*, native Italic-speaking separatists have been blowing up French government buildings.

West and East *Germany*, separated since the end of World War II, affirmed their common nationality by reuniting in 1990 as Cold War barriers crumbled.

Switzerland is often cited as *the* prime example of multiethnic harmony. However, it is a unique case in that its four main groups (German, French, Italian, and Romansch, in that order) each firmly control their own territory with little central government intervention. The Swiss accept few immigrants other than strictly temporary workers.

Austria, with significant legal and illegal immigration since the 1960s of Turkish, Spanish, Italian, and Yugoslav workers who now are established, and more recently receiving many refugees from the Yugoslav strife as well as Romanian, Bulgarian and other job-seekers since the fall of Communism, is trying to become more like Switzerland by restricting further inflow — and is being massively criticized for it.

Italy since its 19th-century unification is effectively homogeneous. An exception is what Austrians call South Tirol (to Italians Alto Adige, won as spoils of World War I),[4] which outside two major cities remains Alpine Austrian in culture and character.

Spain has had periodic outbreaks of terrorism and violence from *Basque* separatists who want their own independent homeland. Also, *Catalonia* has its own tongue (more or less between French and Spanish). Many Catalans nurture hopes of independence.

The former Czechoslovakia separated peacefully into two ethnicity-based countries, the *Czech Republic* and *Slovakia*, in 1993. Czechs and Slovaks speak related West Slavic languages. Slovakia contains two sizeable minorities, Hungarians and Gypsies.

Albania has tensions between its Ghegs and Tosks, now eclipsed by other events.

Former Yugoslavia. In 1991 Yugoslavia split into five countries with that many South Slavic peoples: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, "Yugoslavia" (consisting of *Serbia,* including Kosovo, plus Montenegro), and Macedonia. Majority populations in all save Kosovo speak closely related South Slavic languages but are split by fierce, centuries-old clan and national rivalries complicated by history and religious contrasts. Intense fighting soon erupted between the rump "Yugoslavia" and *Croatia* over Serb-populated areas of the latter,

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which Serbs wished to include in a "greater Serbia," and then spread to culturally and religiously mixed *Bosnia* involving three complexly interfingering groups: Bosnians (Muslim), Croats (Roman Catholic) and Serbs (Eastern Orthodox). Only *Slovenia* to the north and *Macedonia* to the south have up to now largely escaped ethnic strife (though there is tension between Slavic Macedonians and a 25 percent minority of ethnic Albanians).

Then, just as these struggles died down through exhaustion and outside-imposed truces, a new one erupted in *Kosovo* (90 percent Albanian-speaking Muslims versus Serbs from within and outside the region) which was, for the time being, quelled by U.S.-led NATO intervention and "interim" international policing efforts. All these conflicts resulted in large-scale "ethnic cleansing" and massive refugee flows. Reliable figures for dead are lacking, but refugees have amounted to some 4 million (out of 22 million who lived in former Yugoslavia, including a majority of Kosovars, and of Bosnians too if internal refugees are included). Now, *Montenegro* may also split off.

Lands of the Former Soviet Union

Along with the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991, the fifteen ethnicity-based Union republics quickly broke up one by one to form their own sovereign countries. Then, several of those were soon threatened with breakup themselves.

In 1994, Russian and Ukranian majorities in the Dniester River plain of culturally Romanian *Moldova* revolted to set up their own state. An uneasy truce now prevails.

The most serious challenges to the new countries have been in the Caucasus Mountain region.[5] Linguistically Iranian, Muslim *South Ossetia* declared independence from Caucasian, Christian *Georgia* in 1990 and sought to merge with ethnically akin *North Ossetia,* in the Russian Federation. The revolt so far has been suppressed, but some 2,000 have been killed and 43,000 rendered refugees (all told, *1 in 11* Ossetians). Then, in 1992, Georgia's rule in its northwest region, *Abkhazia* (speaking a different Caucasian tongue) was ended by an Abkhaz revolt that drove Georgians out of the territory. (Some 7,000 dead and 200,000 Georgian refugees, *1 in 17* Georgians).

The greatest conflict to date in Russian Federation territory has been in small breakaway *Chechnya* where ethnic Chechens (Caucasian stock and language, Muslim religion) declared independence in late 1994 and were bloodily suppressed — unsuccessfully — by the Russian army. A 1996 truce left Chechnya *de jure* part of the Russian Federation but de facto independent, albeit devastated (some 45,000 dead and 150,000 refugees, altogether a third of all Chechens), as the demoralized Russian troops pulled out. Russian dead has been put at over 80,000[6] — *considerably exceeding American deaths in over eight years in Vietnam.* A new Russian military offensive in late 1999 and early 2000 occupied much of Chechnya and produced over 200,000 refugees. Still, formidable resistance continues.

"The most serious challenges to the new countries [of the former Soviet Union] have been in the Caucasus Mountain region."

Ingushetia, also part of the Russian Federation, has clashed with *North Ossetia* in an effort to reoccupy lands lost during Stalin's wartime expulsion of Ingush to Central Asia. (The Ossetian displaced number some 60,000, roughly *1 in 6* North Ossetians).

A bitter 12-year war between two newly independent South Caucasus countries, *Armenia* (Indo-European language, Christian religion) and *Azerbaijan* (Turkic, Muslim), has raged over Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave inside Azerbaijan but peopled by Armenians. Armenia soon occupied this and surrounding areas amounting to almost 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory. Sporadic fighting continues. Those killed are put at "only" 15,000 but Azeri refugees are *over a million*, fully a seventh of its 1990 population. As if this weren't enough, a detached part of Azerbaijan, *Naxcivan*, seeks independence.

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In *Dagestan*, Russia since mid-1999 has been trying to suppress bombings by Turkic Islamic separatists whose people live mostly along the Caspian Sea coast. (Most non-Turks, ethnic Dagestanis who speak 28 Caucasian tongues, live in the mountains.)

Tajikistan is the one Central Asian republic of Iranian rather than Turkic stock and language; a complicated mix of factions have been fighting despite several cease-fires. (30,000 killed, *1 in 190* of population.)

In 1999 an armed insurrection in Turkic *Kyrgyzstan* broke out but was put down.



Other Central Asian areas are at risk, such as the densely settled *Fergana Valley* (Uzbek-Tajik-Kyrgyz populated). Also the steppes of northern *Kazakstan*, colonized in Krushchev's 1950s-60s "Virgin Lands" program, to the point where Russians and other Europeans, along with groups earelier exiled there by Stalin, came to outnumber the Kazaks in their own country. But since its independence some 2.7 million Russians, Germans, and Ukranians, plus others, have returned "home," significantly reducing Kazakstan's population from its mid-1990s 17 million to 15 million now, with Turkic Kazaks increasing to over 7 million. Even so, 5 million ethnic Russians remain numerically dominant in the north, and are becoming more assertive.

Soviet-sponsored Slavic immigration produced a similar situation in two of the three Baltic countries. In *Latvia*, the Latvian majority was reduced to 52 percent under the Soviets by the early 1990s, Russians and other Slavs having grown to close to 44 percent. From an ethnic Latvian point of view the breakup of the Soviet Union came barely in time. In Finnic-speaking *Estonia*, the ratio of ethnic Estonians to Slavs is estimated at about 62 percent to 35 percent. Since independence, both countries have instituted discriminatory measures toward Slavs, which predictably have produced ethnic tension with the shoe now on the other foot. *Lithuania* has similar problems but less acutely since Lithuanians remain 80 percent of the population, with Slavs (here including many Poles) at 18 percent.

In the *Russian Federation* itself there are many non-Russian ethnic groups besides Chechens who are uncomfortable with Russian control, who form majorities in their own large or small regions, and might well try to separate at such time as they feel they have a chance. Federation territory includes large and small "autonomous" republics or districts formed around fully 38 non-Russian ethnic groups — from Tatarstan and Kalmykia in Europe, to Tuva and Yakutia in Asia. Although in a number of them Russians have become a majority, this gives some idea of the potential for further breakup. Others exist too. In a moment of critical Russian weakness a further fissioning of nations flying off from the Great Russian center could number in the dozens.

Africa South of the Sahara

It might be noted that many of the troubles described in this region, and some elsewhere, have often been depreciatingly and hubristically dismissed as the result of "tribalism." But what, really, is the difference between tribal and national loyalties? Tribes are often thought of as small groups living in more or less primitive isolation. But they are in fact bona fide ethnic groups just as nationality groups are, and the human imperative to stick with one's own group is exactly the same. Nor are they necessarily small — some so-called tribes are larger than many recognized national groups. And, as this region shows, the scale of carnage involved in ethnic strife can be fully as great in "tribal" conflicts as in national conflicts where more sophisticated weaponry is employed. The difference between, say, the current plague of troubles in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda is much less than many tend to assume.

In most of these countries a multiplicity of tongues are spoken — in some, hundreds.

WEST AFRICA

Africa's most populous country, *Nigeria* fought

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one of the bloodiest wars in recent history when its Ibo-inhabited southeastern region seceded in 1967 as *Biafra*. A classic ethnic war raged for three years before Biafra was crushed. Deaths alone are estimated at over *a million*, many from starvation (*1 in 60* of Nigeria's population at the time).

Liberia plunged into civil war in 1990-93, ten years after a tribal force overthrew descendants of freed American slaves. Some *1.3 million* fled their homes (half the population; deaths nearly 200,000, *1 in 13* Liberians). New fighting in 1996 devastated the capital, Monrovia.

Neighboring *Sierra Leone* has also been ravaged by internal war since 1992 with horrible atrocities. Despite a 1996 peace accord, violence and maiming continues.

In the former Portuguese colony of *Guinea-Bissou* civil strife in 1998 emptied the capital, Bissou, and was stopped only by troops sent in by Senegal and Guinea.

THE SAHARA AND SAHEL TO THE 'HORN' OF AFRICA

Morrocan occupation of *Western Sahara* is resisted by Sahrawi nationalist guerillas.

Chad has long suffered from tension and periodic clashes between Muslims (such as Sudanese Arabs in east/central regions) and southern Christians and animists.

The Sudan is split between the Arab North and the black non-Muslim (Christian and animist) South. Since the mid-1980s the South has been in rebellion against Sudan's "forced Arabization" policy. The continuing war and famine has resulted is some *two million* deaths (perhaps *1 in 8* in the separatist region) plus *four million* internal refugees alone.

Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, after a bitter 31-year war resulting in some 150,000 Eritreans killed (perhaps *1 in 15); half a million* refugees fled to the Sudan.

Most people in *Somalia* speak the same Cushitic language — but are deeply divided at the clan level. (As Moynihan remarked acidly, "Ethnic conflict does not require great differences, small will do.")[7] Anarchy prevails. The 1992-94 US-UN effort to suppress warlords and alleviate starvation mostly failed. External refugees alone are in six figures.

"The 1992-94 US-UN effort to suppress warlords and alleviate starvation [in Somalia] mostly failed. External refugees alone are in six figures."

EQUATORIAL AND EAST AFRICA

Strife in *Uganda* under Idi Amin, 1971-1979, was ostensibly political but often ethnically selective: 300,000 people were murdered or "disappeared" (about *1 in 30* Ugandans). Christians were persecuted, and Uganda's 45,000 entrepreneurial Asian Indians expelled en masse.

Rwanda has two main, contrasting groups: the *Hutu*, a subsistence agricultural Bantu people who have comprised 85-90 percent of the population; and *Tutsi*, tall aristocratic pastoralists of a different stock. Several outbursts of Hutu-Tutsi strife with wholesale massacres since 1963. Near-genocide erupted in 1994, in which roughly 800,000 Tutsis and more moderate Hutus were slaughtered at the hands of Hutu mailitias or starved (*1 in 16* of the population), and *two million* fled to refugee camps in Congo, many dying of disease.

Burundi is a near-mirror image of Rwanda, with a similar mix of Hutu and Tutsi. Several Hutu coups and Tutsi countercoups were staged after independence in 1962. In 1972 nearly all educated Hutus were massacred,[8] and further outbreaks in 1993-1999 brought the total of deaths to nearly *half a million* (*1 in 12* of population), and chiefly Hutu refugees to over 800,000.

Since its independence in 1960 the *Congo* (Zaire, 1971-1997) has been plagued by dictatorship, corruption and anarchy, as well as periodic separatism, violence and civil wars. Most recently, chaos has reigned since the mid-1990s with back-to-back

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rebellions from the East. A Congolese general triumphed in the first, aided by Tutsi exiles with support from Uganda and Rwanda; now, *his* regime faces Tutsi-led rebels in the East.

The smaller *Congo Republic* had an outbreak of ethnic hostilities starting in 1997 which devastated and emptied Brazzaville; a Kongo rebel group soon reoccupied it.

In the small former Spanish colony *Equatorial Guinea*, civil violence has taken place on Bioko Island, between the native Bubis and Fang settlers from the mainland region.



SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola has been wracked by almost forty years of rebellion, first against 400,000 Portuguese settlers, who left after 1975. Since then, fighting between three ethnically-based though ostensibly political groups has driven *over a million* from their homes. Outbreaks continued in the 1990s, with Ovimbundu rebels still controlling the South.

Mozambique similarly fought an eleven-year war against Portugal (whose presence dated from 1505), winning independence in 1975. And similarly too, the new leadership was challenged by rival ethnic groups and a long civil war followed. After an agreed peace, some *1.7 million* refugees had returned from across its borders by 1995.

Since establishment in 1994 of a multiethnic government in *South Africa*, an uneasy truce between groups has prevailed. Of its 45 million people, about 70 percent are blacks (Bantu); 17 percent whites (more Afrikaner than English); plus 10 percent "coloureds" (mixed) and 3 percent Asian Indians. But the Bantu majority belong to many ethnic groups often at odds; major ones are Zulu (24 percent), Sotho (17 percent), and Xhosa (10 percent). Since the mid-1980s, over 14,000 have been killed in fighting between the now-ruling black coalition and Zulus in the east. Also, disgruntled Afrikaners have become more active since the governmental transfer. Potential for both Black-White and Black-Black conflict on a huge scale is there.

The Near East

Cyprus has been effectively partitioned into two countries of Greek and Turkish nationalities since 1974, when Turkey's army invaded the island in support of their ethnic kin and proclaimed *The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*. This, and preceding violence and terrorism over Greek majority demands for *enosis* (union) with Greece, produced 200,000 refugees (*1 in 3* on the island) and nearly complete ethnic separation.

Israel and Palestine. The Arab-Israeli struggle is essentially an ethnic conflict between two Semitic peoples with deep roots in the region who have grown progressively farther apart in the vicissitudes of history. What brought it to a head was the establishment of a Jewish state in 1947 after large-scale settlement of Jews in a land Arabs had long had as theirs. In 1967 and 1973 surprise Arab attacks were decisively repulsed in brief but major wars.

The people of *Israel*, excluding occupied areas, are 82 percent of Jewish faith (the rest being mostly Islamic Arabs), which overlays strong ethnic divides between and within the Ashkenazi ("Western") and Sephardic ("Eastern") Jews, though their unity as a Jewish island in a hostile Arab sea has proven stronger. But Arab resentment festers.

The Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip contain strongly Palestinian Arab peoples (though a sixth of West Bank's population are post-1967 Jewish settlers. Gaza is essentially one big Palestinian refugee camp). Demands for a sovereign *Palestine* to include both have become very assertive including a general Palestinian uprising or *intifada* in 1989. Tension persists despite recent, reluctant self-rule concessions by Israel.

The Islamic Near East

Although the countries from North Africa to Arabia and Iraq all speak Arabic, those on their northern tier — Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan — are ethnically very different and their national languages have essentially nothing in common with Arabic.

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While the Arab countries have significant internal strains, most have kept intact in recent decades, whether on account of autocratic governments or the spell of militant Islam.

Lebanon, however, has not. Tensions resulting from faster Muslim growth in this uniquely part-Christian Arab country exploded into civil war in 1975-76; some 60,000 were killed (*1 in 50*) during just those two years. Palestinian exiles joining the fray triggered Syrian and Israeli invasions. Outbreaks continued through the 1980s, the country now being effectively partitioned among groups. The foreign troops remain in distinct areas.

"A major non-Arab (Indo-European, Islamic) group with no state of its own are the 20 million Kurds who predominate in parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran — straddling one rugged region the size of Italy."

Yemen joined with former South Yemen in a merger of similar Arab peoples in 1993.

The Arabs of *Iraq* have their own divides, most conspicuously between Sunni and Shia Muslims. A majority are Shiites, but Sunnis control the government. A Shiite revolt broke out in the south after the Gulf War, but was crushed. And in the north are Kurds.

A major non-Arab (Indo-European, Islamic) group with no state of its own are the 20 million Kurds who predominate in parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran — straddling one rugged region the size of Italy. Though Kurds have staged periodic rebellions in several areas, all moves toward an independent *Kurdistan* have thus far been suppressed.

In *Iran* the Azeris, though mostly Shiite Muslims as are Iranians, are ethnically far different as they are of Turkic origin and language; their 15 million are a quarter of Iran's population. They heavily predominate in the Northwest and have 8 million compatriots across the border in independent Azerbaijan — a long-term threat for Iran.

Afghanistan: Most Afghans speak Iranian languages but are chronically divided between feuding clans, tribes, religious and political factions. These more or less united in fighting the 1980-89 Soviet intervention, which resulted in *two million* Afghans killed and *six million* fleeing to Pakistan and Iran (in all, *half* the population). When the Soviets gave up, internal fighting resumed, with a militant Islamic faction now mostly in control.

South Asia (The Indian Subcontinent)

Predominantly Hindu *India* and Muslim *Pakistan* were carved out of former British India in 1947, that religious partition accompanied by wholesale bloodshed and many millions fleeing in both directions across the new borders. In 1971 Bengalis of then-East Pakistan, separated from West Pakistan by a thousand miles of Indian territory, rebelled to form their own country, *Bangladesh*. Pakistani repression and ensuing strife produced *ten million* refugees and ended with an Indian invasion to seal the secession.

In India 25 languages are spoken by more than a million people each, 15 of them having been given official status as the basis of Indian states. Northern India speaks mostly Indo-European tongues, the southern peninsula several Dravidian languages. Overlaying all these is the Hindu religion. Even so, Islam is practiced by about a seventh of India's current population of a full billion, the ostensible religious division having left a huge Indian Muslim minority. The major cultural bond among educated Indians of all groups is the English language, but officially Hindi is being pushed to replace it.

India and Pakistan have fought over the northern "crown" of the Subcontinent, *Kashmir*, during the whole half-century since independence. Overwhelmingly Muslim, it is still divided along a cease-fire line across which firing has never stopped for long. In Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir state, guerilla activity is at a high pitch with Muslim

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militants now fighting more for independence than for union with Pakistan. Depending on whom one believes, deaths there just since 1989 have numbered 24,000 to 80,000. (Even in the lower range, this is a greater proportion than U.S. World War II deaths.)

Kashmir is hardly the only part of India with a separatist threat. In the *Punjab* region an uprising of Sikhs, whose religion combines elements of Hinduism and Islam, was put down bloodily in 1984 and in 1988 with thousands killed and other searing incidents occurring since. *Tamil* separatists in the South are blamed for assassinating former Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi in 1991. In *Assam*, thousands died in ethnic violence in 1993. Other northeastern trouble spots have involved hill peoples such as the Naga who have been given separate recognition as the small Indian state of *Nagaland*; also what might be called a "binational" state of *Meghalaya* (joining the very unlike Baro and Khasi peoples). Ironically, it often happens that such concessions have not mollified the aspiring peoples for long, but on the contrary have whetted appetites for more autonomy and independence — in very different parts of the world.



Sri Lanka (Ceylon) suffers from a savage and protracted conflict between the majority Sinhalese (Indo-European, Buddhist) and *Tamil* separatists (Dravidian, Hindu) who are close to a fifth of the population and have been fighting for an independent homeland on the north and east of the island, where they predominate. Since the mid-1980s well over 60,000 have died in the war and associated terrorism (*about 1 in 270* of the island's 1985 population, a greater proportion than American World War II losses). In the fiery flareups at the end of the 1990s some 800,000 Tamils fled to India, adding to earlier flows in which many reached the U.S.

East Asia

The 1.2 billion people of Mainland *China* are a fifth of all humanity. Moreover, fully 95 percent of them live in its well-watered eastern half, the arid inland half being its "wild west." Although the eastern core region contains many non-Chinese minorities (55 in all are recognized), these are dominated by the huge number of Han Chinese, 92 percent of the country's total. The Han themselves speak many mutually unintelligible languages (often miscalled dialects) but the vigorously imposed Mandarin is now spoken by more people than all others combined and now can be understood in all parts of China. Then too, all *Chinese* languages have long been written in a single ideographic script.

Nevertheless, China cannot yet be said to be effectively unified. The peoples of the western half, notwithstanding their comparatively small numbers, are numerically still dominant in the larger part of that area, and culturally vastly different. But all of them are objects of a steady, deliberate inundation through a government policy of settling Chinese among them, with resulting cultural-ethnic conflicts.

In these territories (officially called "autonomous regions") that tide has reached the highest level in *Inner Mongolia*, whose population is now over 90 percent Han Chinese. These occupy mostly its less arid fringes which can support larger populations, the drier and larger area adjoining independent *Outer Mongolia* still being peopled mainly, albeit necessarily thinly, by Mongols who practice a Lamaistic Buddhism of the Tibetan type.

The two main, Turkic-speaking peoples of *Xinjiang*,[9] the Uygurs in oasis centers ringing its southern desert and pastoral Kazaks in the north, formed the short-lived Republic of East Turkistan until annexed by Mao's China in 1950. Since then China's control has been nearly total while a continuing policy-driven influx of Chinese has made them a majority (especially in the northeast half of the territory). During the 1990s, incidents such as blowing up of Chinese facilities have erupted as rebellious groups of Uygurs protest what they see as Han colonization of their homeland.

Tibet, home of a unique Lamaistic Buddhist people, is the world's prime current example of

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outright invasion followed by a systematic attempt to obliterate a major ancient culture and replace it with that of the invaders. In 1950 Mao's forces attacked and defeated the small Tibetan army with massive killing of resisters and destruction of monasteries, its cultural linchpin. After an abortive Tibetan uprising in 1959, the Dalai Lama, Tibet's head of state and spiritual leader, fled with 100,000 followers and set up an exile government in India's Himalayan fringes (joined since by 80,000 more). His office estimates that *1.2 million* Tibetans have perished as a result of Chinese occupation, well over a third in combat, including uprisings, the rest as a result of famine, execution, torture, imprisonment, and forced labor. By the mid-1970s only *eight* of Tibet's former 6,000+ monasteries and nunneries still operated, as closely monitored token facilities — the rest were razed. In an effort to swamp the native population, 7½ million Chinese settlers and soldiers backing them have been sent to Tibet (this compares with a total of 6 million Tibetans: 2 million in a Chinese-defined rump Tibet plus 4 million in Qinghai[9] and western Sichuan, historic parts of Tibet annexed by the Chinese regime).[10]

In the present situation it may seem that Tibetans and their 2,000-year-old culture are doomed to extinction or permanent submergence under the Chinese; and that may well happen, as indeed it already has to the Manchus of Manchuria who not so very long ago ruled all China — but a caveat is that over history, extensive and well-established cultures have been very resistant to being wiped out and also quite resilient when opportunity reappears. And in the long run the Chinese might prove not so adaptable to Tibetan altitudes (the plateau averages 15,000 feet), which over millennia seem to have given highlanders inherited physiological advantages in coping with it.

Southeast Asia

Both mainland and insular parts of this tropical region have populations that range from very sparse to extremely dense. Most of them have seen early cultural influences from both China and India, and Arab traders were influential in Indonesia and Malaysia where Islam holds sway. And Islam is overwhelmingly dominant in Indonesia. The Philippines is the only predominantly Christian state in all eastern Asia (83 percent Roman Catholic), a legacy of over three centuries of Spanish rule.

Burmans are 70 percent of the total population of *Myanmar*, but several non-Burman groups (e.g. the *Shan*) prevail in regions where Burma has long faced unrest or revolt. In an ongoing rebellion, *Karen* separatists have had thousands killed, with 100,000 refugees now across the Thai border. And in 1992, 200,000 Indian Muslims fled to Bangladesh, though many have since returned (until next time?).

Two years after formation of the Federation of *Malaysia*, the offshore island-city of *Singapore* was expelled in 1965, due entirely to the country's ethnic divide: mainland Malays feared domination by its Overseas Chinese and their economic power. So, the island with its 77 percent ethnic Chinese is going it alone, and very successfully, thank you.

Vietnam has for centuries had a north-south cultural divide stemming from Chinese cultural influences in the north and Indian in the south. Vietnamese dominate both regions in numbers but several minority peoples predominate in the larger area. After the Vietnam War (Cold War-driven with both sides using ethnic schisms), some 140,000 Chinese fled as "boat people" from Vietnamese harassment to Hong Kong (many later reaching the U.S.). The underlying north-south differences remain.

The Khmer Rouge mass relocation and slaughter in *Cambodia* during the mid-1970s was more ideological than ethnic, though no less horrendous for that. But Vietnamese invasions of the 1970s and 1980s certainly had some ethnic motivation.

Roughly half the 220 million people of *Indonesia* live, incredibly, on the single island of Java. Early cultural influences were from India (Indonesia means "Indian Islands") which spread both Hinduism and Buddhism, both of which later influenced the form of Islam which 87 percent of its population now follows (brought by Arab traders in the 14th-15th centuries). Christianity, introduced mostly via the Dutch, is professed by 9 percent. Major languages are of the Malay group, many islands having their own tongue.

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Like the other countries of Southeast Asia, Indonesia has a significant immigrant-descended Overseas Chinese population with economic strength beyond their numbers. These believe they were made scapegoats when in 1965 after an attempted coup, 300,000 were killed in army-led massacres as alleged Communists.

There is also *regional* ethnic dissension. In the *Aceh* region at the north end of Sumatra, separatist fighters have been carrying on an insurgency since the 1970s. An independence movement in the *South Moluccas* has been active since the early 1980s; in early 2000, violence escalated between Muslims and Christians on Ceram.

In *East Timor*, Portuguese control from about 1520 produced a society distinct from the general Indonesian, most notably in that its people are mainly Roman Catholic. Portugal's granting of independence in 1975 was thwarted by an Indonesian invasion. The UN estimates that during the 24 years of Indonesian occupation, 225,000 (or *1 in 3*) East Timorese were killed or died in resulting famines. Then, in August 1999, its people voted 78 percent in favor of independence in a UN supervised election. Indonesia promptly turned its militias loose on the island, who produced almost total chaos with 230,000 refugees fleeing or forcibly taken to Indonesian West Timor, and perhaps as many internal refugees bringing the displaced to over half the East's population. A hastily improvised Australian-led peacekeeping force restored a measure of order, but over a human landscape almost totally devastated. Finally Indonesia gave up; a UN commission is now charged with preparing the region for independence.

In mostly rainforest-covered *Irian Jaya* (western New Guinea), the Papuan people are very different, tribally grouped black hunter-gatherers of animistic beliefs speaking some 250 tongues (some different from one village to the next within a day's walking distance) and most of whom have hardly entered the 20th century. However, Indonesia has been fostering a continuing large-scale "transmigration" with over 250,000 having moved there — 1 in 8 of its population are now Malay-speaking brown Indonesians. A Papuan independence movement was smashed by the Indonesian army during the 1970s and 1980s, leaving thousands of guerillas dead. New outbreaks occurred through the 1990s. Papuans fear being inundated, but lack effective unity and organization.

Oceania

This region consists of far more water than land, including Australia and thousands of far-flung islands in the Pacific. Its oceanic vastness is conventionally subdivided into three major regions: Melanesia ("black islands") from New Guinea to New Caledonia to Fiji; Micronesia ("tiny islands") from the Marianas including Guam to Palau to the Marshalls and Gilberts; and Polynesia ("many islands") bounded roughly by the enormous triangle with apexes at New Zealand, Hawaii, and Easter Island. Excepting Australia and New Guinea, its original peoples speak Austronesian tongues. Ethnic tension most notably exists today in five of the region's political units.

In *Papua New Guinea* about 715 indigenous languages have been counted, more than in any country on earth. Roughly 84 percent of its people are of Papuan stock and languages, the rest "New Guinea Melanesians" in certain coastal and island areas. Fighting between government forces and secessionist rebels on Bougainville (who want to join the nearby independent and ethnically similar *Solomon Islands*) cost some 20,000 lives in the 10 years prior to 1997, when a truce was signed.

New Caledonia is a French overseas territory. Indigenous Melanesians make up about 42 percent of the population of nearly 200,000, with Europeans, mostly French, close behind at 37 percent. New Caledonian voters in a 1987 referendum chose to retain ties with France — after which there were riots including clashes between Melanesians ("Kanaks") and the French. An accord signed in 1998 provided for a 15-20 year period of "shared sovereignty" between the groups with France committing to a gradual increase in autonomy. As formerly in Algeria before the mass French exodus resulting from independence, the large number of French settlers with their very different European culture presents a troublesome problem regarding its future status.

In *Fiji*, indigenous Fijians (Melanesian) are 49

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percent of the population, and descendants of 19th century British-introduced Indian contract plantation fieldworkers have grown to 46 percent. (Fijians are Christian; Indians a 5-to-1 Hindu-Muslim mix). Fijian politics are dominated by this ethnic divide, and in 1987 Indians succeeded in electing an Indian-led government. It was quickly ousted in two coups staged by the Fijian-run army, and in 1990 a new constitution guaranteed Fijian control. Ethnic tension continues.

The widely scattered islands of *French Polynesia* form a French overseas territory. A third of its land area and well over half the population is on Tahiti. Polynesians dominate numerically with 78 percent, Chinese are about 12 percent. French make up the remaining 10 percent (6 percent local French, 4 percent metropolitan French), and hold political power, but in recent years an open desire for independence has appeared among Polynesians.[11]

The Americas

The New World is in many ways a reflection of the Old, in that those descended from European conquerors or settlers control the major countries today. In the broadest sense there are four groups: 1) Descendants of the earliest known migrants, miscalled Indians; 2) Descendants of white European settlers/conquerors, typically a merging of several European groups into a single nationality sharing a common Western culture and language; 3) European-Indian mixtures, commonly called mestizos in Spanish-speaking regions, who, in many countries have come to predominate while retaining basic aspects of European culture such as language; 4) Descendants of African slaves brought in by Europeans during the mid-16th to mid-19th centuries, now in various situations from majority control to minorities ranging from assimilated to slighted. Often they retain distinct cultural traits though speaking European languages.

Populations of American Indians were decimated by European contact, partly from conquest and harsh treatment but more from diseases to which they had acquired little natural immunity. Only in the last century have their numbers begun to rebound in a modest way, though often from a small base. They and their basic cultures now form majorities or something approaching it in only four countries.

Countries where European-descended whites are a majority are also relatively few in the Americas, but four of them cover huge and important areas. From south to north they are Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, the United States, and Canada.

Countries in Latin America with mixed or mestizo majority populations run the gamut from Chile to Mexico. These genetic mixtures are mostly Indian-white in various proportions, ranging from rather heavily European in Chile to rather heavily Indian in Mexico. The large mixed populations tend to be politically in control, frequently in conjunction with a white European minority. Majorities in the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico are mixed European-African, of Spanish speech and culture.

African-descended blacks have political control in Belize, Jamaica, and Haiti, as well as in the small independent eastern Caribbean island countries.

Although about 55 percent of the 170 million people of *Brazil* are of European descent — Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, German, and others, though virtually all speak Portuguese — the North and South are quite distinct racially. Various mixtures of white, black and Indian are 34 percent of the total population, and "pure" blacks perhaps 11 percent ("native" Indians are only 0.1 percent). Mixed-bloods and other people "of color" are a majority in the regions from São Paulo state north, while the three states to its south are overwhelmingly European in descent (like nearby Argentina and Uruguay). In this southern Brazilian region a political movement to separate from the polyglot North has existed for some years.

The three countries astride the central Andes — *Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador* — by contrast, have high Indian populations today, forming 40 percent to 60

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percent of each country's total and a large majority in the high plateaus except in a few major cities. Quechua (the language of the Incas) is spoken as first language by some 8 million, and the related Aymara in the Lake Titicaca region by about 2 million. (In terms of primary ancestry, these groups are perhaps twice those numbers.) In the coastal regions Spanish-speaking mestizos predominate. These, allied with a white minority, are in political control in all three countries, the Indians still marginalized as a legacy of the Spanish conquest of over four and a half centuries ago. Highland Indian revolts have occurred in the past and could again, with reviving Indian awareness of their ethnic-cultural roots and recent Indian-based guerrilla and terrorist activity in Peru especially. The survival of a highland Indian majority through the centuries may be due in part to better physiological adaptation to altitudes of 12,000-15,000 feet at which so much of the region lies. (The highest human habitations on earth are here, at 16,000-ft. levels.)

Colombia has been wracked in the last half-century by political violence both rural and urban. Something like 200,000 lives were lost in *La Violencia* of 1948-58. Since 1987 an estimated 35,000 (1 in 900 of pop.) have been killed in the troubles. While an ethnic component exists, economic (today especially drug trade) rivalries have dominated.

In offshore *Trinidad and Tobago* as well as in the nearby mainland countries of *Guyana* and *Suriname*, blacks are large minorities of 30-40 percent, but in all three there are similar or greater numbers of East Indians or "Hindustanis" (Hindu and some Muslim), and in Suriname a large element of Javanese (Muslim); the Asians descend from 19th-century plantation contract laborers brought in after slavery ended.

In all three there has been simmering ethnic tension. Asian groups in Trinidad have attempted two coups. Just before Suriname's independence in 1975 there was a mass exodus of mainly Asian Indians who feared the ending of Dutch rule, in which some 40 percent of the then-population emigrated (chiefly to Netherlands).[12] Throughout the 1980s an organized group of interior Suriname's riverine "Bush Blacks," descended from early escaped slaves, ran a guerrilla campaign that halted with an uneasy peace in 1990.

The island territories of *Martinique* and *Guadeloupe* are each full departments of France with proportional representation in the French parliament. Their people are chiefly black and mixed-race descendants of slaves, speaking Creole dialects of French. Separatist violence has occurred since the 1970s in both, despite French concessions.

Among the small population of *Belize*, blacks ("Creoles") and mestizos are the two most numerous groups; also Maya Indians, Garifunas (black-Indian mixtures), plus some whites and Asian Indians. Guatemala has long claimed "Belice" and Britain keeps a troop contingent there as a deterrent. But a Spanish-speaking mestizo inflow persists.

Guatemala is the one country in Central America where "pure" American Indians may outnumber mestizos (figures given vary with definitions). In any case, estimates show that at least 40 percent of Guatemalans speak one of 23 Maya dialects as their first language. Most live in the highlands. Other than a few major centers like Guatemala City where Spanish ways dominate, Maya culture is very much apparent everywhere.

Guatemala has suffered severely since the 1960s from political and ethnic violence, coups, assassinations, and insurgencies with regional guerrilla and terrorist activity involving several Maya groups pitted against the government and its paramilitary allies, with innocent villagers forced to choose sides caught in the middle. During the last 35 years of off-and-on violence some 150,000 people have been killed, 50,000 "disappeared," and a *million* rendered refugees (most to Mexico despite that country's efforts to stop the flow and forcibly return them, and many reaching the U.S. through "underground pipelines") — all from a 1968 population of 5 million (today 12 million).

The huge and growing population of *Mexico*, now past 100 million and concentrated heavily in the southern part of its great central plateau, is ethnically about 60 percent mestizo, 30 percent indigenous Indian, and 9 percent white, chiefly Spanish. (The Indian-white admixture in mestizos favors the Indian

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by perhaps 3 to 1.) The Indian population is hardly monolithic with some 50 languages spoken, many not speaking Spanish at all. "Pure" Indians, despite being glorified officially and in literature and song, and many having a rich heritage of advanced civilizations, are still Mexico's poorest citizens and very much marginalized from the mestizo-Spanish mainstream of national life. In truth, the diverse indigenous peoples have never recovered from the Spanish *conquista* five centuries ago.

The late 20th century, however, has seen a discernible reawakening of Indian consciousness. The greatest of Mexico's several Indian-majority regions is its Southeast (Yucatan Peninsula and parts of Tabasco and Chiapas states), where Maya predominate outside a few major cities. While Maya is not a unified language, one or another Maya dialect is spoken by at least a million people there (plus several millions in Guatemala). These were the last major people to be subdued by the Spanish, and several Maya revolts later occurred. During 1994 there was an uprising in eastern *Chiapas* among a group of Maya highland farmers, suppressed by Mexican troops; discontent still festers. Mexico's whole Maya region has to be regarded as an area of potential separatism.

"[In Mexico] the late 20th century has seen a discernible reawakening of Indian consciousness."

On the north flank of the United States, *Canada* is a state (country) composed of two distinct nations — one English-speaking and one French, the original settlement of French having preceded the English. Britain's defeat of French forces in 1759 opened Canada to a British (and American Royalist) influx, making English the majority language and culture. French settlement of land, however, was already firmly established in the St. Lawrence lowlands, where French culture and language predominate today as much as ever. The largest number of Canada's total present population is of British Isles (including Irish) origin, numbering overall about 40 percent of its 31 million people. Non-French Continental Europeans account for 20 percent, and people of other overseas origins (especially Asian) have increased to 12 percent. Indigenous people, American Indian and Inuit, today make up only 1.5 percent of the total. It is important to note, however, that among the non-French groups English is almost always the new language of choice, so Canada's "Anglophones" can be put at around 70 percent.

French-Canadian "Francophones" are a quarter of the Canadian population, an extremely significant grouping heavily concentrated in *Quebec*. Since the early 1960s, Quebec nationalism has become increasingly assertive, with the province in 1976 and 1980 electing an avowedly separatist government whose measures to insure the survival of French have extended to legal suppression of English in commerce and education. In 1980 the Quebec electorate voted 60 percent to 40 percent against secession from Canada (which means nearly half the Francophone voters approved). In late 1995 a second referendum was held, with the "yes" vote this time failing by a razor-thin margin of only one percent. A large majority of French voted for secession, the margin against attributable to the Quebec Anglophone minority who naturally voted as a bloc. Another plebiscite is promised at what Québécois leaders find an opportune time, with demographic trends favoring the French — as English-speakers, chiefly in the Montreal area and shrunk to half their former 20 percent of Quebec's population, continue to leave.

If (some say when) Quebec does secede, it would create enormous problems for what would be left of Canada. The four Atlantic Provinces would be physically separated from the rest of English Canada by a now-foreign country occupying half the present country's demographic heartland. Not that passage would likely be denied — the main question here is not so much whether Quebec could go it alone (it could), as whether the rest of Canada could hold together should Quebec leave. Might the economically depressed Atlantic Provinces at some point form their own country or countries, or perhaps petition to join the United States? In any case, Ontario, which has a population equal to the rest of English Canada

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combined, would politically dominate whatever is left. Would the more prosperous western provinces, already at political odds with the East, long submit to that, or would they too choose to separate?

And now, what about the American Nation?

By any measure, this record of ethnic troubles should give one pause. The tally for the cases mentioned here, just in the short time period since the latter 1960s, is about fifty sovereign countries either having had ethnically related *wars* (civil or external) or major separatist violence or terrorism.[13] And at least another twenty-five have either regional ethnic troubles or visible tensions, separatist activity and so on. Adding others not mentioned which have not been particularly active or noticed during those 35 years or so, but with explosive potential depending on developments, certainly brings them to well over half the present 194 sovereign countries (states) on earth. Then, a number of countries face several separate problems involving different groups; this survey alone lists in italics no less than 120 specific regions of ethnic troubles or tensions — and many others (e.g., in Russia and Africa) have been omitted for reasons of space. These are all multiethnic/ multicultural/ multinational countries. Countries uniting during this time are only two — Germany and Yemen — but those involved peoples of the same nationality. Garrett Hardin stated the proper goal thus: "unity within nations, coupled with diversity among nations."[14] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has said virtually the same.

What do these troubles — affecting all parts of the world — portend for the United States? The American nation has, until recently, been largely free of such concerns. The major problem of this kind had been the legacy of black slavery from before the Civil War. By the 1960s America was finally making visible progress toward effectively integrating its black population into the nation, as the last major group to achieve it. Descendants of the several waves of 19th and early 20th century European immigrants had for the most part been successfully assimilated. But that trend slowed, then broke in the wake of the 1965 immigration law. Naively intended as a modest humanitarian gesture, it has in fact opened the floodgates for massive chain migration of Third World peoples of disparate cultures who can soon bring in relatives, crowding out quotas to the point that Europeans can now squeeze in only with great difficulty. Less than one in ten new immigrants to the U.S. are now of European origin and culture.

The Politically Correct view, now riding high, is to encourage diversity and multiculturalism, the opposite of the assumption once held by virtually all Americans, that new immigrant groups would assimilate as they have in the past. The processes that set this in motion and have sustained it to the present are beyond our scope here, but have been amply explained and documented in detail by Peter Brimelow in his eye-opening book *Alien Nation*. In any case, the demographic makeup of the U.S. is changing swiftly, fundamentally, led by legal immigration and deepened by illegal immigration, both of which the American nation seems to have lost the will to stop or even significantly slow. Post-1965 Third World immigrants and their descendants will easily become an actual majority within the next half-century or so if present trends are not checked.[15] In Brimelow's words: *There is no precedent for a sovereign country undergoing such a radical and rapid transformation of its ethnic character in the entire history of the world.*[16] (Excepting only some cases of forced intrusion by conquerors and occupiers, *not* naively encouraged by the affected country itself.)

"The Politically Correct view, now riding high, is to encourage diversity and multiculturalism, the opposite of the assumption once held by virtually all Americans, that new immigrant groups would assimilate as they have in the past."

As a number of the worldwide examples cited here show clearly, rapid change in ethnic composition is one of the prime fuses leading to explosions of ethnic conflict and strife. In America these changes

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were wholly unnecessary, the troubles now looming from it self-inflicted. Many Americans, both liberal and conservative, including many in high places, still are blind to the existence of a problem and favor even higher immigration rates to further increase "diversity."

But diversity of this kind and on such a scale can become divisive, as the world has seen happen again and again, and yet again. Ethnic consciousness and affinity are primordial, closely akin to family ties. Family, clan, tribe, nation — these terms denote the same human impulse, deeply rooted in human nature. It is by all indications instinctual and cannot be wished away. In our reluctance to firmly limit immigration, we are planting seeds of grief not seen in this country since the Civil War. But we clearly do see it when we look realistically at multicultural countries in other parts of the world.

Even so, this has made as yet little impression on many Americans. It all seems so far away, so foreign to the American experience. It is underreported in the news media. And, among the public and news media alike, a knowledge of history and human geography is woefully lacking. Consequently, there is a failure to see these situations for what they are, part of a worldwide upsurge in ethnic consciousness and a desire of each group for an independent existence, overwhelming assiduously promoted notions of political unity based on class or ideology. How far this process will go there is no telling, but the drive has existed throughout human history, dormant at certain times and places, breaking out in others. And with the huge flow into the U.S. of ethnically and culturally very different peoples since roughly 1970, coupled with birthrates below replacement levels among native-born Americans, it is coming to the United States with breathtaking speed.

Assimilation was indeed effectively occurring during the middle decades of the twentieth century when the U.S. had a "breather" from immigration, and quotas for those who did come were roughly in proportion to the existing ethnic makeup of the American majority, thus keeping it stable. Even the relatively few of non-European backgrounds were assimilating, precisely because they were just that — few. But during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, assimilation has not just slowed, it has reversed. It is now apparent that America has exceeded its capacity for assimilating large, culturally contrasting groups. While some outstanding individuals are successfully fitting in (and consequently receive doting coverage in the media), more simply are not. Especially among the larger immigrant groups, many are not learning English in more than rudimentary form, if at all.

Partly this lack of assimilation is a matter of numbers, partly of official policy. Increasingly, newcomers don't need to. All this is exacerbated by fashionable celebrations of diversity, multilingual education (*multi* meaning anything but English), and official disincentives to becoming part of the American culture that immigrants presumably came here to join.

What will be the end result of all this? In the absence of major changes in U.S. immigration law and practice within a few years, it's not hard to foresee. In a word, America could become balkanized. If one piece breaks off, others may follow as various ethnic groups who have coalesced into regional patterns unpredictable in detail form their own separate nation-states. Although the processes that could bring this about are fully discernible, most Americans still cannot envision such a future, secure in a naïve faith that this country will always be here for them and their descendants no matter what.

The situation is not yet hopeless. An American wake-up might still come in time to avert national disintegration. A rational first step would be a moratorium on legal immigration until new priorities with greatly reduced quotas can be sorted out, coupled with a thoroughgoing effort to halt the illegal flow and regain control of U.S. borders. All this can certainly be done (illegal entries were stopped cold in the mid-1950s). The crucial question is: can America muster the will to do it in these liberally minded times?

Immigrants already here and their descendants would not be the least to benefit from a major reduction of new immigration. They came, after all, seeking a better life than the one they had left, which will not be possible to achieve if the flow continues to inundate America's capacity either to generate decent employment opportunities or maintain social cohesion. And no group, immigrant or native, will benefit if

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America's population balloons to approach the densities of India or China, as it certainly will during this century if the current influx continues unabated.

Will we be forgiven by our descendants if we allow this to happen? The chances of dissolution of the American republic before a tricentennial can be celebrated may now well be, shall we say, fifty-fifty. A fateful coin has been flipped, and it is in the air.

TSC

NOTES

[1] The 70 percent figure is an estimate pending U.S. Census 2000 results. It does not include Near Easterners (mostly Arab and Iranian) as European, although official U.S. classifications count these as white.

[2] Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics.* Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. X and 54.

[3] U.S. casualty figures from *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2000*, p.217. Numbers of wounded normally exceed the dead, but figures for killed and refugees are simpler, more available, and less ambiguous. Statistics for the Revolutionary War and War of 1812 count battle dead only. (For subsequent U.S. wars, "other deaths" are included.) Various sources used here for other world regions include news media reports.

[4] South Tirol as referred to here denotes the northern area bordering present-day Austria, *not* the Trentino region to the south which does have a large ethnic Italian majority; both were transferred to Italy in 1918 as one package. This as a part of the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I, its territory apportioned among seven different new and existing countries in a classic case of ethnic partition — but in this case Austrians were separated from *their* country. That great war itself had been triggered by an ethnicity-based incident, the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne by a Serb nationalist in Sarajevo, capital of then-Austrian-ruled Bosnia.

[5] An outstanding map of languages in the Caucasus grouped by type, graphically showing the region's ethnocultural complexity, along with a brief article giving summaries of recent conflicts and estimates of casualties and refugees, is in *National Geographic*, Feb. 1996, pp.126-131. Figures from that piece have been used here.

[6] The 80,000 figure is from *The Economist*, Sept. 25, 1999, p.59. Worth noting is that on his first day in office, Russia's leader Vladimir Putin visited Russian troops in Chechnya who were besieging its nearby capital Grozny, and told them, "This is about how to bring about the end of the breakup of Russia, that is your fundamental goal." (Associalted Press dispatch, Jan. 3, 2000) A neat play of language — Putin was referring to Russia the *state*, of which Chechnya is officially a part. But Chechens consider their region, and people, as *nation*, which in the true sense of the word it is — a nation in the process of attempting to become a sovereign state of its own, against all odds. If anything, they are persistent; they repeatedly fought the czars during the 19th century, and returned as a people in the 1950s after mass deportation by Stalin to Central Asia during World War II. But Russia is clearly worried about how the other non-Russian nationalities it contains would react to a completed Chechen secession.

[7] Moynihan, p.15.

[8] *Encyclopedia of World Geography*. Oxford: Andromeda Oxford Ltd. (Barnes & Noble revised ed., New York, 1995), p.176.

[9] In the now-favored Pinyin transliteration of Chinese into Roman script, the letter X is pronounced as the English *sh*, and Q as *ch*.

[10] Overall figures given by Tendzin Choegyal, brother and advisor to the Dalai Lama, in remarks at a seminar delivered at Hillsdale College, Michigan in autumn 1998 and published in its newsletter *Imprimis*, April 1999. Breakdown as follows: died in combat 433,000; from famine 343,000; in imprisonment 173,000; from execution 157,000; from torture 93,000; driven to suicide 9,000; see Joseph Fallon, "Undermining Tibet's Moral Claims," *The Social Contract*, Summer 1997, pp.255-58.

[11] See Peter Benchley, "French Polynesia," *National Geographic*, June 1997, pp.2-29, for some observations on recently developing ferment for independence there.

[12] *The World Almanac 2000*, p.862.

[13] Forty of those fifty have undergone major wars having ethnic roots. In ten of them the conflicts are actively raging even as this is written.

[13] The quote is taken from Hardin's essay, "The Conservation of Diversity," his preface in *The Immigration Dilemma: Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons*, p.iii, Washington, D.C.: The Federation for American Immigration Reform.

[15] According to U.S. Bureau of the Census projections, based on (1) recent rates of immigration by regions of origin, (2) low rates of natural increase (births over deaths) of native-born Americans, compared with (3) much higher natural increase for the most numerous recent immigrant groups including second-generation descendants.

[16] Peter Brimelow, *Alien Nation: Common Sense about America's Immigration Disaster*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995, p.129 (The emphasis is Brimelow's.)

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Projections for Year 2100 by the Census Bureau

by Joseph Daleiden



The U.S. Census Bureau just released its first forecasts for the year 2100. As usual, the Bureau calculated three series of projections, Lowest, Middle and Highest, based upon different assumptions of fertility, mortality and immigration rates. As shown in the chart, the projections for the end of this century range from almost no change to an astounding increase in population to 1.2 billion, about the same population as China has today.

The low forecast which shows a stabilizing of U.S. population would require an *immediate* drop in immigration from the present level of about 1.3 million legal and illegals annually to less than 200,000, and a continued decline to only 117,000 by the end of the century. Fertility rates would also have to fall dramatically from today's 2.04 children per woman to 1.6 children per woman by the end of the century.

The Middle Series would result in the population more than doubling to 571 million. This projection assumes that immigration is in the range of 900,000 to one million annually. Fertility rates rise very slightly to 2.2 children per woman by the year 2100.

It should be noted that, in effect, this projection ignores the current wave of illegal immigrants and thus understates immigration by 300,000 to 500,000 annually. By understating current im migration, it also probably understates the increase in fertility rates associated with increasing immigration.

The Highest Series assumes that immigration will continue to increase dramatically as it has in recent decades, reaching three million a year by the end of the century. It also assumes that higher immigration levels will result in driving up the fertility rate to 2.7 per woman. This is not unreasonable since the average fertility rate for Hispanics today — the source of the

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largest number of immigrants — is 2.9.

It should be understood that these projections are not predictions but choices, since the underlying assumptions of immigration (and to a large extent fertility rates) are determined by policies that the U.S. chooses to enact. It should also be understood that since it takes about 50 years for reduced immigration to be fully reflected in reduced population growth (fertility rates usually drop only with the children and grandchildren of immigrants), the longer we delay in reducing immigration, the larger the population increase.

Therefore the longer present excessive immigration levels are maintained, the more likely it is that total population will fall somewhere between the Middle and Highest Series. Moreover, based upon the experience in the U.S. and elsewhere, the more legal immigrants that arrive in a country, the greater will be the number of illegal immigrants. The reason is that legal immigrants frequently arrange to bring in family members both legally and illegally.

Therefore, it is possible that unless America reforms its immigration laws and regains control of its borders, immigration and population growth could well exceed the level of the Highest Series.

Certainly, if the *Wall Street Journal* and Libertarians who advocate an open borders policy get their way, America's population will soar far above even the Highest Projection of the Census Bureau. There is a very real possibility that by the end of this century, America will become not only the most populous nation on Earth, but the most densely populated nation as well. Already it appears that California will surpass China in population density in this century. TSC

A Faulty Demographic Road Map to the Future

by B. Meredith Burke

By the year 2100 the U.S. current 275 million population will most likely be a) 275 million; b) 571 million; c) 1.2 billion; d) somewhere in between. Welcome to the exercise of assessing the Census Bureau's newly-revised projections to the year 2100. The Bureau first generated a "middle" level set of projections for each category, then tied "low" and "high" projections to this. The authors expressly state that they do not consider the extreme projections likely.

Projections are only as good as their assumptions. The Bureau's assumptions of the course of future fertility and migrations certainly invite criticism.

Consider fertility. National projections incorporate a starting level (easily attainable from the NCHS, the National Center for Health Statistics), assumptions about how many children women in a given group will bear in the future, and about possibly changing proportions of total births contributed by various ethnic or national origin groups. Projections generally measure fertility by the TFR or total fertility rate, the number of births a woman can expect by the end of childbearing given the rates prevailing in the specified year. The Bureau defined its "low" and "high" levels as 15 percent divergence from the year 2025 middle level, and 25 percent divergence by the year 2100.

The Bureau's tables start by projecting to 1999 the actual 1998 TPRs of non-Hispanic whites (hereafter referred to as "whites"), blacks, American Indians, Asians, and Hispanics (nearly all of whom are white though they may be of any race). The white TFR has hovered at the 1999 level of 1.8 all decade long (National Center for Health Statistics data). Yet

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the report's authors contend that this was "near 2.0 and 2.1," throughout the decade, or 10-15 percent higher than their own table accurately uses.

Which of the "low," "medium," or "high" projections has the most probable white fertility assumptions? Since 1972 white women have consistently shown fertility not just below the replacement level of 2.1 but well below. The Bureau's "lowest" projections posit that the TFR for this group will gradually decline to 1.55 by 2100, which seems consistent with the current very low fertility in a number of Western European nations. The "middle" projections posit a slight increase to 2.07 by 2100. This 15 percent gain, a certainly possible fluctuation, seems less than likely given the century's probable increasing environmental stress, rising housing costs, and near-universal labor force participation by this group.

We can dismiss out of hand the "high" projection's assumed white fertility path, rising to 2.6 by century's end. This level was last seen in the early 1960s as we were emerging from the postwar baby boom under socioeconomic circumstances unlikely to be duplicated.

Blacks show higher fertility than whites under age 25 and lower thereafter. Since 1980 their TFR has varied between 20-40 percent higher than the white TFR, partly reflecting the different age distribution among childbearing-age black women. As this differential has narrowed (black teenage fertility is falling — though still two-and-a-half times the level for non-Hispanic whites), the low series' assumption that black fertility will drop to 1.8 by 2025 and 1.6 by 2100 is plausible. Here the middle series' assumption of reaching, then hovering around replacement-level fertility does seem the most realistic. The "high" series assumption that the black TFR will rebound to 2.6 by 2100 seems highly unlikely.

Since 1993 Hispanic births have outnumbered black. It is the course of Hispanic fertility, already the second largest ethnic category and possibly by the year 2200 if not before the largest, that is the most contentious — and the most influential in determining the 21st century path of total U.S. fertility. Its seeming stability at the 3.0 level throughout the 1990s (two-thirds higher than that of non-Hispanic whites) masks the changing ethnic composition of Hispanic women giving birth and the different fertility levels and trends of these subgroups. Mexican and Central and South American-origin women are now 70 and 14 percent of Hispanic mothers, followed distantly by Puerto Rican-origin women (bearing 7.8 percent of Hispanic births), and by Cuban-origin women (1.8 percent).

TFRs for the two largest categories, 3.3 and 2.6, are being buoyed by births to foreign-born women, 61 and 91 percent of their respective categories.

"It is the course of Hispanic fertility ... that is the most contentious — and the most influential in determining the 21st century path of total U.S. fertility."

Meanwhile, since 1994 the Puerto Rican TFR has fallen to just above replacement level due to a drop in below age-25 rates (it remains to be seen if this drop signifies postponement or the emergence of lower desired ultimate fertility). Conversely, Cuban fertility has risen from a very low 1.4-1.5 in a continuing drop to Mexican-American women. (The vast majority of Hispanics applying to legalize their status under IRCA resided in California and had entered since 1980.) By 1990 the Hispanic TFR had rebounded to 3.5, where it remained through 1993, the last available year. If we assume that the fertility of Mexican-American women in fact continued to decline during the 1980s to a TFR of 2.3 by 1990, Mexican nationals need have a TFR of 4.1 to yield an overall 3.5.

The Bureau states it bases its short-term (to year 2025) projections upon birth expectations data and demographic predicting convergence to the national level. However, should large-scale Mexican and Central American immigration (legal and illegal) continue, the largest fraction of Hispanic women giving birth in 2025 may never have expressed their birth expectations to an American researcher. Furthermore, as Hispanics play an ever-greater role in influencing national fertility levels, they may be

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converging toward their own level: a mathematical tautology.

The report's low series shows the Hispanic TFR declining from 2.9 in 1999 (the latest published data, for 1997, shows 3.0) to 2.3 by 2025 and 1.7 in 2100. Given the slow assimilation of a low fertility ideal by Americans of Mexican origin this rapid assimilation by a largely foreign-born group with initial median education of six years is improbable in the extreme.

The middle series assumes a drop to just under 2.7 by 2025 and to below 2.6 by 2050. For this to occur the at- or below-replacement TFRs for Puerto Rican and Cuban-origin and native-born Mexican-origin women would have to fall precipitously to balance the 3-to-4 TFR of the dominant group, Mexican nationals. Alternatively, immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries would have to be sharply curtailed — which conflicts with the assumptions about immigration embodied in the projection.

The high series (recall, 25 percent above the middle series post-2025) supposes the Hispanic TFR to remain in the 2.9-3.1 interval. This is quite likely for the first quarter-century but arguably too high for the long-term.

Mexico's own fertility is falling, and presumably immigrants entering later on will show lower fertility than those of the recent past. Balanced against the 1.8-2.2 fertility range of the other Hispanic groups the blended fertility level may fall to 2.5-2.7. Without curtailing immigration the overall Hispanic TFR may most likely lie between the middle and high assumptions.

Total national fertility reflects both the rates and the weighting of the various ethnic groups. It will never near the level of the lowest group(s) as long as significant differences remain among the largest categories. Therefore, the low series is immediately seen as implausible. But the high series is equally implausible as it posits that whites return to a fertility level incongruous with the likely physical and social environment. The middle series may prove to be quite accurate because dubious assumptions cancel out. The higher fertility and greater weight we consider most likely for the Hispanic category will be offset nationally by the very low fertility and diminishing weight of the white category (we will assume that blacks and Asians will hover around replacement level). The middle set of projections posits a slight rise to a 2.2 TFR for most of the century.

"Without curtailing immigration the overall Hispanic TFR may most likely lie between the middle and high assumptions."

Immigration has emerged as the major source of American population growth in the last decade of the 20th century, if natural increase (births less deaths among this group) is included. How plausible are the immigration assumptions of the different sets of projections?

The Bureau correctly notes that predicting immigration involves more uncertainty than projecting fertility or mortality. The first is highly and immediately responsive to policy shifts. The Bureau also says its "middle series" of projections should be considered the most likely. Presumably, then, this series should use the most likely assumptions about each of these variables.

As pertains to immigration, "most likely" is an ambiguous term. Does this arise from a constant net flow or from unchanged public policies? Note the two are incompatible.

In the 1990s legal immigration has been running on the order of 1 million plus a year. This does not correspond to the number of people who physically legally entered the country with an intention to settle permanently. INS terminology includes many already here who applied for a change in status, as well as excluding many who physically entered the country ineligible to apply for legal permanent resident status at this time but who qualify to do so later. Refugees and asylees (among others) are generally admitted above quota.

Estimates of net illegal entrants range from 300,000 to 500,000 annually. The Census Bureau stubbornly adheres to the figure 225,000 for annual increases to the illegal population, even as the INS has

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used 275,000. Considering that the number of entrants applying to legalize their status under 1986 IRCA legislation was twice that originally estimated, a strong case can be made for a higher number. Each revised official estimate is higher, and the Bureau's own Current Population Surveys — which are widely assumed to undercount those here illegally — suggested that in 1990-94 Mexico alone generated 250,000 illegal entrants annually. The Center for Immigration Studies suggested 400,000 a more plausible estimate of annual illegal entrants from all sources.

Currently, there has been growth in foot traffic from Central America and southern Mexico headed to the U.S. border; the Canada/U.S. border is emerging as an entry point targeted by smugglers of illegal entrants from Asia and the Middle East. Recent news stories about the use of containers intended for ocean freight being employed as "cages" for transporting aspiring entrants to the U.S. suggest that the ingenuity of smugglers has yet to be fully tested.

"... the high series assumes in-migration as 1.4 million in 1999, 2.6 million in 2025, 3.3 million in 2050, and 3.6 million in 2100."

The report estimates in-migrants, out-migrants, and net migrants. It uses absolute numbers for the first, rates for the second, and numbers for the last variable. The Bureau ties its "low" and "high" estimates not to U.S. internal policies or increased outside demographic pressures but to arithmetic assumptions about the ratios of high estimates to middle, and middle to low. In 2050, yearly intake under the high assumption is 75 percent higher than the middle; in 2100 150 percent higher. Under the low assumption intake in 2050 is 57 percent of the middle; in 2100 it is 40 percent.

For the period 2000-2030 the "middle series" assumes "a modest rise in in-migration from 1,234,000 in 1998 to 1,272,000 in 2002, a decline to 1,036,000 by 2010, followed by a gradual rise to 1,090,000 by 2020. The Bureau assumes that IRCA-related family reunification will decline without any counter-balancing increase from other recent entrants, and that refugee admissions from Yugoslavia will decline, again without any new surge of refugees. Legal migration from Mexico is assumed to return to the levels of the early 1990s by 2010. Illegal entrants from Mexico and Central American are assumed constant at the levels assumed for the 1990s base series.

From 2020 to 2030 in-migration would increase from 1,090,000 to 1,450,000. Henceforth, for the rest of the century, migration into the U.S. would remain numerically constant at 1,450,000. By admitting that projecting a large increase in entrants "would tend to overlook the possibility of restrictive policies" intended to limit such a shift, the Bureau tacitly acknowledges that its mid-level set of estimates assigns a high probability of movement toward more restrictive legislation. This is nowhere stated as a precondition for a stable intake of 1.4 million.

The "low series" assumes an influx of 1.1 million in 1999, 628,000 in 2025, 643,000 in 2050, and 580,000 in 2100. Though the report's authors do not state this, such a decline would require both far more restrictive legislation *and* far more effective border patrol enforcement along with willingness to deport illegal aliens. Note that the authors did not calculate a series that (given low domestic fertility) would stabilize population by year 2050 if not before. That level would not exceed 200,000.

Finally, the high series assumes in-migration as 1.4 million in 1999, 2.6 million in 2025, 3.3 million in 2050, and 3.6 million in 2100.

As for the numbers of emigrants: the Bureau assumes the annual foreign-born emigration rate (returnees) will be constant throughout the middle series at 12.1 per thousand (1.2 percent). As the base foreign-born population increases, this will result in larger numbers of out-migrants. [Note: the Bureau concedes that since the middle series posits a constant number of in-migrants, this implies a decline in annual net immigration and "an even greater decline in the impact of (immigrants) relative to the overall population size."]

Inexplicably, the "high" and "low" series'

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emigrants were not assumed to vary with the base population (which would be correspondingly higher or lower than that in the middle series) at a steady rate of 1.2 percent. Rather, the *rate* of emigration was assumed to vary in inverse proportion to the change in the projected numbers of entrants. The result is to assign a 0.9 percent exit rate to the high series base population in 2000 and a 1.5 percent exit rate to the low series base population. By the year 2100 the exit rate for the high population is down to 0.49 percent while that for the low series is 3.0. The result is to exaggerate the extreme net immigration estimates: the high is larger due to fewer leavers; the low is smaller, due to a very high rate of out-migration. Note that the emigration assumptions result in 463,000 out-migrants for the low series in 2100, 524,000 for the middle series, and 586,000 out-migrants for the high.

To appreciate how extreme these rate assumptions are, consider the base foreign-born populations the Bureau has calculated for the year 2100. By dividing the number of emigrants by the applicable rate we see the Bureau has somehow calculated a total foreign-born population in 2100 of 15.4 million for the low series (most peculiar as the number of net immigrants this model allows for in the preceding 60 years is roughly 10.5 million, a likely estimate of those alive in 2100). The middle series yields a total foreign-born population in 2100 of 43.7 million; the high series 119.6 million (again, the model allows for 172 million net immigrants total during 2040-2100, so the mortality assumptions must be quite high). The emigration assumptions would have us believe that base populations ranging from 15 million to 120 million would produce an emigrant flow that varies only by 125,000 per year!

There may well be a change in the rate of out-migration over the course of the next century — but a more defensible assumption is that this will vary over time and be caused by world conditions rather than by the size of the resident foreign-born population.

The middle series permits net immigration to fluctuate between 912,000 and 984,00 during the century, ending at 926,000. The low series claims a net of 739,000 for 1999; 183,000 for 2025, and a mere 117,000 by 2100. The high series begins with an arguably realistic net flow of 1.2 million in 1999; a near-doubling to 2.3 million in 2025; a continuing rise to 2.8 million in 2040; and to 3.0 million by 2100.

To assess the policies that would result in the "low," "medium," or "high" net immigration estimates, consider the demographic context of these projections. U.S. officials optimistically project that today's 6 billion world population will add "only" 3 billion by year 2050 and perhaps another 1.5 billion by 2100. Mexico, by far the largest source of U.S. immigrants legal and especially, illegal, may see its current near-100 million rise to 250 million or more. For the past three decades Congress has maintained an expansive view towards entrants, adopting the world's most generous family reunification policy.

"For the past three decades Congress has maintained an expansive view toward entrants, adopting the world's most generous family reunification policy."

The Bureau contends that with static numbers of entrants, the numbers from the Western Hemisphere and Europe will diminish and be just offset by growing numbers from the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, China, and sub-Saharan Africa. The critical reader will wonder how a continuing sharp increase in the number of Mexicans age 15-30, the ages most likely to emigrate, will result in a diminished number of entrants, and how a grossly-enlarged world population will generate only a tiny increment to those attempting to enter the U.S.

Is it realistic to think that in this context a constant net flow will result from unchanged policies and enforcement?

By opting for a constant intake the "middle series" in fact presupposes a more restrictive policy.

If the Census Bureau really wanted to emphasize the fact that immigration is policy-generated and not a "given," it could present its immigration estimates in terms of national policy. The Bureau could starkly inform its audience that, first, the public and our

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policymakers need to decide: do we want a constant population, a constant immigration flow, or a constant policy? Then it could present its analysis of what each course of action would entail.

The middle estimate could be described as that resulting from "unchanged policy which tends to peg entries to the numbers striving to enter"; lower estimates resulting from "constant or declining numbers of entrants which implies a more restrictive policy"; or higher estimates as those resulting from "liberalized policy which expands quotas faster than the number of entrants applying."

By describing its immigration estimates in terms of "likelihood," the Bureau reinforces in the mind of the naive reader the false impression that projections are self-fulfilling prophecies that cannot be readily changed.

Demographers understand projections are merely road maps to the future. They depict where a certain path will deliver us. If we don't like the destination, we can change our path. Unlike what many of the lay public, including politicians may think, projections are mutable. Indeed, if we know our desired destination, we can seek out paths that take us there.

Unlike cartographers, demographers offer more than one road map or set of assumptions as demographic behavior is less fixed that a road system.

Usually they offer a "low," "medium," and "high" set of projections corresponding to the assumed course of future fertility, mortality, and migration. The "medium" level is often regarded as the most likely and tends to assume present behavior will continue.

Unfortunately, the Census Bureau's new projections seem founded more upon wishful or politically-placating assumptions than upon a disinterested assessment of recent behavior and the forces likely to affect it over the course of the next century. TSC



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Confronting America's 'Open Borders' Challenge

The ideological context of Labor's defection

by Miles D. Wolpin

The adverse consequences of mass immigration and majority support for restrictive reforms should elicit elite responsiveness in a democratic system. Similarly, trade unions have historically reflected their members concerns by seeking to protect job security. What ideological, identity and coalitional factors explain the intensity of opposition — now reinforced by the AFL-CIO — to effective border control? Can a defense of national sovereignty be successful in the new millennium?

Recent decisions by the AFL-CIO to embrace high levels of immigration signal an abrupt turn away from Labor's traditional role as protector of jobs.

Recent poll data indicates growing citizen concern over urban sprawl and demographic congestion. By the same token, surveys have revealed rather consistent public support for a *more* restrictive policy toward immigration — the major source of urban and national population increase.

Given this simple relationship, why have our state and national elites evidenced such studied indifference or even hostility to countering this silent invasion of close to 1.5 million per annum? Other than largely symbolic acts (e.g., moderately heightened border patrol manpower or the denial of drivers licenses to illegals), no effective measures have been adopted in recent years to restore the integrity of citizenship. Most efforts have been rebuffed, ruled unconstitutional or rolled back.

In a nutshell, the explanation is anything but simple. Like abortion and other highly controversial issues, there are intrinsic complexities that contribute to a full understanding of elite behavioral differences. Several of these are highlighted below.

Globalism vs Nationalism

One major source of diversity which emerged first within liberalism and subsequently sharply divided conservatives pertained to the relative value assigned to nationality and the nation state. Internationalism began to become a major force in liberalism more than a century ago.

World War II, and particularly the Cold War, brought most conservatives on board. Reinforcing this internationalist trend was the growing influence upon liberals of socialistic egalitarian and statist ideas in the early 1930s. A parallel emerging faith in global "free markets" was championed by business-oriented conservatives as well as a generation of Vietnam era ex-liberals (neo-conservatives).

Thus, while the socio-economic frame of reference differs, dominant elites in both liberal and conservative sectors have firmly embraced a globalist paradigm. Hence, migration, overpopulation and economic growth as well as human rights, poverty, etc. are viewed as essentially international phenomena requiring only global institutional approaches.

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Within both major ideological traditions however, there are sectors which in varying degree reject the "globalist" claim that global "interdependence" has all but rendered the nation-state obsolete if not downright anachronistic. Thus, some pro-labor liberal Democrats have vigorously opposed Clinton's NAFTA and China-trade initiatives. Among socio-cultural conservatives, identification with our nation- state and the need to preserve its sovereignty as well as its protective role is even more intense.

"...there has been tenacious opposition to both tariffs and immigration restrictionism as the globalization of the world economy progressed during the last three decades."

Notwithstanding the most reasoned critiques of globalist assumptions, we cannot expect conservative or liberal internationalists to be responsive to those favoring primacy for *national* demographic, cultural or economic security issues. Worse, our media, "informed" public opinion, educational institutions, major corporations, and both major parties are for the most part dominated by these cosmopolitan elements. This notwithstanding mass opinion which tends to favor immigration control, trade protectionism and avoidance of military interventionism abroad.

Unfortunately, like population control, these issues are not very salient for poorly informed, increasingly cynical and marginally competent mass publics. Only the "checks and balances" dimension of our governmental structure and occasional recalcitrance abroad, enables nationalist sectors to limit or moderate the internationalist jihad.

Why Has Globalism Become the Dominant 'Conservative' Ethos?

Two post World War II developments played a major role in the globalist takeover of American conservatism. First was the fear of Communism. This resulted in support for global politico-military alliances and ubiquitous interventionism. Indeed, during the Vietnam era it attracted an impressive contingent of moderate liberals, who now with new recruits are virtually hegemonic neo-conservatives in the Republican Party. They have actively sought new superpower missions in the post Cold War era.

As the ferocity of their vitriolic denunciations of Pat Buchanan's "isolationism" reveal, these sectors are tenaciously committed to a globalist ethos which encompasses institutionalized alliances, and "foreign aid." The former, in turn, tend to be more politically effective when there is hospitality to foreign nationals including aspiring immigrants. Driving this globalism are free trade ideology, the transnationalization of U.S.-based major corporations, our economy's growing dependence upon foreign credit and investment, etc. — powerfully reinforcing and targeted for corporate-oriented sectors

Thus a second imperative is global "growth" maximization — free market ideology's *deus ex machina* — which implies an absence of restraints or taxes upon cross-border movements of factors of production. Because this lowers costs, there has been tenacious opposition to both tariffs and immigration restrictionism as the globalization of the world economy progressed during the last three decades. While not invariably successful, Washington's politico-military intervention — and the institutional panoply (IMF, WB, WTO, NAFTA, NATO) it dominates — is intended to promote such "open" and ordered economies abroad. Ironically, the AFL-CIO has for many decades participated in this overall effort to weaken socialist and nationalist unions abroad. Of late, it has been blithely assumed that the export and/or imposition of controlled formal "democracies" will promote these "conservative" goals!

Have the Liberals Become Fellow-Travelers?

If "old fashioned" patriotic nationalism appears archaic to globally connected neo-conservative elites whose friends and money are increasingly abroad, the hiatus is even more extreme for egalitarian-oriented welfare-statist liberals. In addition to being "soft" on Communists during the Cold War era, contemporary liberal elites in government, media and academia matured during the Vietnam era when Third Worldism

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combined with Civil Rights guilt complexes synergistically alienated them from the traditions and institutions of middle America. Consequently, since the 1970s, if not before, they have become soft toward culturally radical deconstructionists of American identity.

The upshot has been an unquestioning embrace of "multiculturalist" ideology and a utopian humanitarian commitment to the universalization or imposition of Western-derived "human rights" norms regardless of national cultural diversity let alone frontiers. Among the more militant "Liberals," there is a decided anti-Euro-American animus manifested by an unquestioned belief that virtually all of the problems of non-whites are due to exogenous oppression.

Thus "immigrants' rights" have become sacrosanct regardless of illegal status or their effects upon American citizens. Coalitions have been promiscuously forged with radical minority activists and ethnic elites. The rule of law has been impugned by advocacy of affirmative action, enforcement double standards, and concessions when anti-white militants threaten violence. Trade unions have been viewed as organizations to be penetrated from above and taken over from top to bottom by "oppressed" groups or their white radical sycophants in a drive for hegemony vis-à-vis Euro-Americans.

For these "Liberal" reductionists, the route to a global utopia is international solidarity with romanticized people of color, and an eventual takeover of the free market inter-governmental organizations that set rules for the international system. More moderate liberals or neo-conservatives who are inclined to question politically correct assumptions (e.g., the desirability of affirmative action or open borders) are ubiquitously intimidated by the threat of demonic invective (e.g., "racist"). The latter, of course, is tantamount to career suicide or a bad corporate image.

As equal protection double standards erode the rule of law and the demographic balance shifts, the multicultural "Liberal" jihad intensifies its attack not only upon remaining traditional ideas, symbols and institutions, but it also simultaneously endeavors to denude American citizenship of its European ethno-cultural content and obligations.

Has Organized Labor Defected?

Since the 1960s the ethnic and racial composition of organized labor has become less Euro-American. This demographic change has been especially pronounced among unions organizing large numbers of semi- or unskilled workers. These include UNITE, the Teamsters, the Hotel and Restaurant Workers, the United Food and Commercial Workers, SEIU and of course, the tiny and almost wholly Hispanic United Farm Workers.

Thus during the past two decades it is unsurprising that Labor's welfare-state-oriented elites and staff have gradually assimilated a multiculturalist/immigrant rights commitment. This in turn was — despite some resistance and operational contradictions — catalyzed by an intimate and uncritical embrace of affirmative action-oriented civil rights elites since the 1960s. Also integral to Labor's "new unionism"were multitudes of Vietnam-era Third Worldist radicals who entered organized labor as militant organizers, activists and staff in the 1970s and early 1980s. Some percolated up in the previously mentioned unions, while others became active at urban, county and state levels. With John Sweeney's 1995 election as federation president, a number of these and other radicals were appointed to federation staff positions.

"Thus 'immigrants' rights' have become sacrosanct regardless of illegal status or their effects upon American citizens."

The departure of Labor from historic protectionism of employment opportunity and security for American workers was first apparent fifteen years ago. The AFL-CIO acquiesced in a massive congressional "one-time" amnesty for millions of illegals in exchange for easily-evaded employer sanctions legislation. While Labor has continued to oppose agricultural "guest worker" programs and other "temporary" urban largely skilled employee

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quotas, the latter have gradually increased over the past decade. This despite one or two modest Labor victories on the issue.

More striking has been the AFL-CIO's tacitly growing sympathy since the mid-1980s for the mass influx of both legal and illegal unskilled workers who constitute — with their relatives — approximately 80 percent of the current immigrant total. And this, in turn, is the primary source of American demographic increase (about 70 percent) and racial transformation. Nor have there been any Labor demands that economic (i.e., labor market) consequences be governing criteria for immigration policy. The latter has been driven by a motley congerie of employer, ethnic and Realpolitik interests.

Hence at the close of the 1980s, the federation "sat on its hands" as the 1990 Immigration Reform and Control Act's amendments — increasing quotas by over a quarter of a million — were pushed through Congress. By the late 1990s the federation was assisting "open borders" lobbyists intent on reversing 1996 amendments which targeted alien criminals and incentives for illegals.

"More recently there has been an intense drive by California-based Hispanic militants and their multiculturalist Liberal allies within the AFL-CIO to end support for even nominal employer sanctions."

More recently there has been an intense drive by California-based Hispanic militants and their multiculturalist Liberal allies within the AFL-CIO to end support for even nominal employer sanctions (vis-à-vis illegals). Associated objectives include less enforcement funding for INS, an end to interagency cooperation, and another massive amnesty — thus strengthening the magnet for new illegal aliens. The latter's status should be equivalent to that of a citizen. At the AFL-CIO's February 2000 Executive Council meeting, a resolution embodying these and related policies was unanimously adopted. Given the federation's dominant civil rights/multiculturalist ideology, recalcitrant labor elites risked demonization as "racists."

This takes place notwithstanding decades of decline in private sector union members as a percentage of the labor force. By the end of 1999, it had plummeted to 9.4 percent, an all-time low. That decline is due in part to free trade outsourcing and intense employer hostility to unionization. But beyond yet related to this, labor market inundation by unskilled migrants has also made organizing, collective bargaining and successful striking more difficult in this context. The immigrant flood of unskilled job seekers also accounts for a quarter of the decline in real wages as well as contributing to economic insecurity, disproportionate criminality, poverty and increased competition for welfare-state expenditures.

Without even adding the member alienation engendered by this de facto "open borders" permissive elite posture on immigration in conjunction with militant intra-union affirmative action discrimination, one can pose the question whether Labor's radicalization is contributing to its own long term decline as a major liberal force in American politics?

By becoming more internationalist, weakened national unions don't necessarily increase their effectiveness in defending members where union density is on the wane. Hence advocating the inclusion of symbolic or largely unenforceable labor standards and human rights guarantees in international trade agreements is unlikely to vitiate an erosion of domestic bargaining power, let alone alienation of a substantial sector of its constituency. While in the short run an end to nominal employee sanctions may facilitate the organization of some illegals, on a longer horizon this and an amnesty will be counterproductive for organizing and bargaining leverage by inflating rather than tightening labor markets.

Illustrative of organized labor's bargaining power decline has been the sharp downturn in its ability to wage successful strikes to increase wages or prevent the erosion of fringe benefits. Nor have contracts over the past decade improved living standards. By barely

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keeping up with inflation but not productivity, they explain in conjunction with outsourcing why the unemployment decline has not sparked inflation.

Indeed, most of the new jobs created in the past decade for wage earners have been non-union "bad" ones — temporary, part-time, low wage, or fringe benefitless. It is no wonder that almost three-quarters of 18-34 year old workers claim they don't have enough to live on! For it is here that the migratory influx competes most intensely with unskilled Americans and particularly black citizens.

Even among skilled and professional sectors, there has been a dramatic rise in underemployment due to Labor's weakness in the legislative arena. Today, almost 50 percent of academics under 35 are of non-American origin. And this is increasingly the case in other professional sectors too where affirmative action preferences — as among the unskilled — are used to discriminate not only against whites but also to the detriment of increasingly resentful black Americans. The latter is intensified by anti-American discriminatory practices integral to ubiquitous network hiring among illegals and legal migrants.

The Temporal Dilemma and Balkanization Prospects

Three cardinal political maxims are central to the foregoing patterns. First, mass organizations (e.g., unions) are elite-dominated. Second, short term elite interests generally predominate. Third, intense organized minority concerns (e.g., employer, ethnic) tend to supervene antithetical majoritarian aspirations which are not particularly salient for the mass constituency (e.g, union members, the electorate).

To become behaviorally operative, the alien influx must be perceived as *directly affecting* ordinary citizens' economic security and/or quality of life. There is an aversion, often coupled with a lack of intellectual ability, when it comes to fathoming indirect relationships. Hence, until a sharp economic downturn and/or mass ethno-racial violence occur, the prospects for immigration control reformers will remain problematic.

In such circumstances localized Euro-American protests are certain to evoke intensified reactive ethno-racial militancy. Yet in the absence of a unified nationalist movement characterized by strong populist commitments and charismatic leadership, it is unlikely that a growing border control constituency will be effectively mobilized. Such a broad-based national movement is essential if the dominant Liberal and neo-conservative elites are to be dislodged from their stranglehold over our major institutions.

"Until a sharp economic downturn and/or mass ethno-racial violence occur, the prospects for immigration control reformers will remain problematic."

If and when such a process begins to unfold, there will be considerable defection within labor, the media and. our political system as well as its coercive apparatus by less ideological and more opportunistic elements. This will be facilitated by the fact that nation states and traditional institutions — despite some weakening in recent decades — remain as powerful underpinnings of middle class identification, loyalties and legitimacy. Hence their appeal will fuel the nascent patriotic movement.

Without considerable unity, however, the latter is unlikely to prevail. Religious traditionalists are an important constituency. So are national-oriented environmentalists. Can a reasonable compromise be struck on the inflammatory "choice" (abortion) issue? Almost as vexing is the conflict among nationalists over the issue of ethno-cultural and racial exclusiveness. Ultimately, as the stridency of anti-Euro-American entitlement demands intensify while the demographic balance deteriorates, our survival as one rather than several nations will hinge upon whether and how such conflicts are resolved.

Beyond the transcendence of these tensions are such crucial matters as coordination, tactical adroitness and above all, new leadership. Charismatic leaders have been essential to all successful citizen-based nationalist movements. TSC

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Labor Joins the Charade

by James O. Goldsborough

The American labor movement, in a complete reversal of policy, is urging a blanket amnesty for all illegal immigrants. The call was made by the AFL-CIO's executive council at a meeting in New Orleans.

It's a good thing the AFL-CIO wasn't meeting in California. Consider the absurdity of the proposal:

The nation will spend nearly $5 billion this year on the Immigration and Naturalization Service to stop illegal immigration. In addition, we are adding $90 million to the Border Patrol budget to hire another 430 agents, bringing to nearly 8,500 the number of agents on the borders, a figure that has doubled in five years.

The AFL-CIO would have us reward the people who have slipped by the INS and the Border Patrol. Result: We would have 4 million to 5 million undocumented workers with union cards but no green cards.

This is a radical turnabout for labor, which, unlike Congress and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, has long and consistently opposed illegal immigration. For labor, undocumented workers have taken jobs from legal workers, depressed wages, weakened the union movement and created a black market work force.

Labor is right about that. In California, undocumented farm workers have badly weakened the United Farm Workers, for example, which three decades ago had 80,000 members under contracts. Today, even as the state has proclaimed Cesar Chavez Day (March 31) an official holiday, the UFW is but a shadow of what it once was.

The AFL-CIO turnaround is easily explained. With millions of undocumented workers present and showing no signs of going home, let's organize them, says the union.

The potential for organizing undocumented immigrants, bringing their wages and benefits up to AFL-CIO standards, is considerable. In a recent study for RAND, immigration analysts Georges Vernez and Kevin McCarthy reported that earnings for legal immigrants were 50 percent less than for U.S.-born workers, with the difference widening. Undocumented workers earn even less.

Labor now has joined Congress and industry in the great immigration charade.

Congress denies the INS the power to inspect field sites, making it impossible to find illegal farm workers. Further, because Congress has never passed a workers' ID law, without which illegal workers can't be identified, the INS last year abandoned industry work-site inspections. The policy of employers' sanctions has been dropped.

Immigration policy today is driven by economics, not by law or social values. We should have great sympathy for the INS, striving to do its job even as Congress, business and now big labor wink at each other. Even the venerable Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan supports immigration (which depresses wages and holds down inflation), and, like the others, doesn't worry whether it is legal or illegal.

The argument for open borders and free immigration made by people like House Majority Leader Dick Armey (and indirectly by Greenspan), has become unofficial policy. They argue that expansion is served by downward pressure on wages exerted by new immigrants, legal or illegal.

So why complain? Can Congress, business, Greenspan, Armey and now the AFL-CIO all be wrong? New workers, they argue, depress wages, increase profits, fight inflation and pay taxes.

This is a hard subject. The Mexican workers in California who trim hedges, mow lawns and

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pick strawberries do good work, legal or illegal. They are as good people as the rest of us.

My objection is to the hypocrisy of our policy. We wink at the laws today, then turn against the immigrants at the first sign of recession. Proposition 187 was a disgrace because it was California's attempt legally and institutionally to discriminate against people we had willingly hired. No wonder the courts threw it out.

Congress deceives the nation. It pretends we have a tough immigration policy, when real policy is made with little winks and nods. When voter outrage gets too high, as during the 1991 recession, Congress fatuously provides more money to the INS, but never provides the tools — such as workers' ID cards — with which illegal immigration might be stopped.

Economics should not be the only determinant of immigration policy.

If economics alone determined community policy, all cities would look like Houston, with no zoning, or Los Angeles, where zoning came too late.

If economics alone determined industrial policy, we would have no anti-pollution laws, no clean air and water laws, no endangered species laws; anthracite coal would still belch into the skies, cars would still get 10 miles to the gallon and tobacco companies would still buy our politicians.

So why allow economics alone to set immigration policy? Immigration should take into account communities, resources, pollution, population, poverty, infrastructure, schools, transportation. It should consider both the long and short terms. It should bear in mind that while new workers are useful in a boom, they are the first to lose jobs in a downturn.

The downturn will come. The current boom already defies the Phillips Curve and Milton Friedman's natural rate of unemployment, which both show full employment leading to inflation, killing expansion. We have been at full employment for more than a year.

So let's not be too hard on the AFL-CIO. It held out longer than anyone else for sensible policy and only threw in the towel when it realized the game was rigged.

I wonder what song the union will sing when the recession comes, as it will, and the new members with no green cards are on the street. As the song says — will you still mind? ■

Unions Desert Workers

by Samuel Francis

As Dr. Johnson commented about the prospect of being hanged, the announcement last week that the executive council of the AFL-CIO has unanimously approved a resolution calling for mass amnesty for illegal aliens ought to concentrate certain minds wonderfully. Not the least concentrated should be those of the libertarian and free marketeers, who have warbled for decades over the glories of immigration of all kinds, legal and illegal.

Libertarians and free marketeers also like to warble about the evils of labor unions even more than they do about the glories of immigration, of course, so it might come as just a wee bit of a shock to them that the labor establishment is now making use of illegal aliens to resurrect its fading power in the American economy and politics.

One of the economic advantages of illegal alien labor for the people who use it is that such aliens are easily exploited. You don't have to pay them minimum wage, provide health benefits, worry too much about safety measures on the job site, or be concerned about strikes.

Samuel Francis, Ph.D. is a nationally-syndicated columnist.
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The aliens are here illegally, and they can't go to the government or a union to complain or file lawsuits. That's why free market trumpeters love them so much.

But if the aliens get amnesty, those days will be over. Unions, which have declined in membership from more than one-third of the national labor force at the end of World War II, now represent barely 10 percent of the private sector labor force. Once amnesty for illegals kicks in, that will change. The amnestied aliens will flood into the unions, and the unions will be back in business with plenty to complain and lobby about and with a horde of new voters to back them up.

In short, what the libertarians and free marketeers have done with all their bubble talk about immigration is help resurrect socialism — and not only socialism as it used to be in the 1930s, but socialism with a racial edge. So far from conservative Republicans being able to win the working class Hispanic votes of the future, those votes are likely to go to champions of Big Government and the Brown Resolution.

As for the benefits to American workers or even to those immigrants who chose to obey U.S. laws and immigrate legally, the unions have effectively abandoned them. "What a betrayal of American workers," says Texas Republican Lamar Smith, an advocate of immigration reform, "Apparently, union bosses are so distraught about declining enrollments they will stoop to exploiting illegal workers."

"Labor leaders," the *New York Times* reports, "are stepping up efforts to unionize hundreds of thousands of immigrants who work in farms, hotels, construction, meat packing and many other industries," and every alien the unions sign up will have a job that used to belong to an American worker.

Moreover, the amnesty and unionization of illegals will pull even more illegals across the border. Illegals come now because the American job market and the wages it offers are so much more attractive than what they can find in Mexico and other Latin paradises — even without the protections that legality and union membership would confer.

But with the prospect of legalization through amnesty and membership in unions, illegal entries will skyrocket. Border enforcement is almost impossible today, but with amnesty and unionization as magnets, there will be no way to control the border, short of military force.

What the AFL-CIO decided to do this week, in other words, is one more betrayal of the American workers it's supposed to be looking out for, and one more act of treachery against America and its people. But the unions are not alone in their treason.

Almost every other institution that has lost members in the last generation or so also champions unrestricted immigration. Churches do because fewer and fewer Americans attend their services. Teachers and school systems do because many Americans don't have children anymore, and without kids to teach, there's no reason to have people to teach them.

And, of course, political parties want more immigrants because it means more voters to mobilize and pander to. So do welfare bureaucracies, which find among immigrants new social problems to tinker with.

About the only group that doesn't have a vested interest in importing a new population through immigration is the American people themselves, who watch helplessly as their jobs are taken by aliens, their communities invaded and destroyed, their government captured, and their culture and civilization undermined and abandoned. If there are any Americans left who want to halt their dispossession through immigration, they can forget about looking to established leaders in business, labor, religion or government to help them. The only people who can help Americans today are Americans themselves. TSC

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The Globalist Copout

Why aren't immigration numbers part of the population problem?

by Stuart Hurlbert

The Globalist Copout states that since overpopulation is a global problem, the ways of dealing with it must be primarily global or international in nature. It is ok for individual nations to attempt to control their own birth rates. But they should not control or reduce their immigration rates, even if immigration is the major cause of their population growth. It would be "unfair" if one country were able to stabilize its population well ahead of other countries, especially if it were an industrialized western country. So goes the "reasoning."

The U.S., for example, should deal with its population problem by ameliorating the social, political, and economic problems in the rest of the world that cause so many to attempt to come here. Then, in some later century or millennium, they will prefer to stay home.

The Globalist Copout is a device used in the U.S. primarily by four groups of people:

1) as a mantra by the saintly innocents, who *claim* the moral high ground with vague references to "human rights", "social justice", etc. and who are apparently truly without understanding of the consequences of the open border or high immigration policies they advocate;

2) as a smokescreen by those who want high immigration rates so they will have a good supply of cheap labor:

3) as a smokescreen by those who want high immigration rates, but usually only for their own "group", however defined, in order to increase its political power; and

4) as an excuse for inaction by those afflicted by *el fenómeno microcojónico, a* condition especially widespread among university academics, environmental organizations, scientific societies, other professional organizations, and to a lesser extent among the general public.

This condition is characterized by acute cognitive dissonance which results from full awareness of the problems posed by high immigration, guilt feelings over their luck in being U.S. citizens, and great fear of being called names in public. The epithets favored by the attack dogs are "racist", "nativist", and "xenophobe". The attack dogs come mostly from the three other groups. But even *microcojónicos,* after enough coffee and/or Viagra, have been known to "go postal" on persons who raise immigration issues.

By far the largest and most influential group, it is the *microcojónicos* who are the primary obstacle to stabilization of the U.S. population and the long-term health of the Salton Sea, the Colorado River and its delta, and other environments of California and Baja California, among thousands of other ecosystems in decline.

Prime Practitioners of The Global Copout

There are so many, choosing is hard! But below we give brief synopses of the copout stances of one political party, one scientific society, and one environmental organization.

THE GREEN PARTY OF CALIFORNIA

This paragon of saintly innocence claims to advocate protection of the environment more strongly than do other political parties. Their internet website presents a detailed platform on population and immigration issues. It refers to that majority of the U.S. population favoring reductions in immigration as

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being "xenophobic" and "reactionary." As usual, such shameless rhetoric is a smokescreen for hiding weak arguments and forestalling reasoned debates the name-callers would be likely to lose.

The website says that even "militaristic fortification of the border" will not stop illegal immigration, that illegal immigrants do not displace native workers, and that they have a positive effect on the economy. Therefore the U.S. should provide full social and educational services to illegal immigrants and should not penalize persons or companies who employ them. The Party acknowledges that the population of California is expected to double in 30 years. It does not even hint that legal and illegal immigration are primary drivers of this increase.

The Greens are giving the Democrats and Republicans stiff competition for the Masters of Myopia Prize.

THE ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA

Composed of scientists who study deserts, prairies, and forests, lakes, rivers and oceans, the plants, animals and microbes that inhabit them, and the influence on them of man's activities, this is the largest and most diverse group of environmental scientists in the U.S. There is no group more knowledgeable about the relation between U.S. population growth and environmental degradation. But this society has shirked all responsibility for doing anything about it.

In 1991 it published "The Sustainable Biosphere Initiative: An Ecological Research Agenda" (*Ecology* 72:371-412). As a research agenda and request for more funds for research, it is fine. But as stated by Ludwig et al. (*Ecol. Applications* 3:547-555), "Such a claim that basic research will lead to sustainable use of resources in the face of a growing human population may lead to a false complacency: instead of addressing the problems of population and excessive use of resources, we may avoid such difficult issues by spending money on basic ecological research."

The document addresses the global population issue briefly and says nothing whatsoever about U.S. population growth (despite coming from a U.S. organization).

A few years later it was suggested that the society prepare another white paper that dealt specifically with U.S. population growth, its causes and environmental impacts. The suggestion was turned down. The nation clearly cannot count on such academic-dominated societies of *microcojdnicos* to speak or act in the national interest on difficult topics - except perhaps in exchange for more research funds. Fortunately, the civic role they fear to play has been assumed by other organizations. These include Population-Environment Balance, Negative Population Growth, Californians for Population Stabilization, the Federation for Immigration Reform, and the Carrying Capacity Network, to name a few.

THE SIERRA CLUB BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Until 1996 the Sierra Club, a U.S. environmental organization, advocated stabilization of the U.S. population via reduction in both rate of natural increase and immigration rates. in 1996 its Board of Directors and its so-called "Environmental Justice Committee" decided that population was a global problem and that the Club should have no position on U.S. immigration levels and policies.

Through a petition process, those wishing to have a policy in favor of reduced immigration levels forced the Board of Directors to have a membership-wide vote on the issue.

Using tactics that would make Gordon Liddy proud, the Board of Directors organized a campaign of disinformation and dirty tricks. These *ad hominem* attacks on initiative proponents as "racists" and "migrant bashers", along with membership apathy, defeated the initiative. Voting took place in April 1998 — 6 percent were in favor, 9 percent were against, and 85 percent of the members didn't vote.

In his victory press release, Sierra Club President Carl Pope crowed, "Our members have shown they understand that restricting immigration into the United States will not solve the environmental problems caused by global overpopulation" — as if the global scale is the only or most effective one at which the problem can be dealt with!

The cognitive dissonance underlying such amazing statements has been nicely analyzed in an article, "Cry, the Overcrowded Country" by Diana Hull (*The Social Contract*, Vol. IX, No. 4, Summer 1999). TSC

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The Public Interest and the Global State

by William B. Dickinson

Viewed from space, a TV anchor recently gushed, only "imaginary lines" separate nations from one another. Imaginary? On the ground, the borders that demarcate sovereign nations are real enough and likely to remain that way, globalist hoopla notwithstanding. But one does not need to be a survivalist scanning the skies for black helicopters to worry about the spread of such notions.

Yes, national economies are increasingly intertwined. Yes, the information age brings us all in closer contact via computers, wireless telephones and the Internet. Every week I e-mail greetings and gossip to friends I made in Romania. I push the "send" icon and milliseconds later the transmission is completed.

But I have never doubted that even the poorest nations cherish their separateness — the cultural, historical and ethnic distinctiveness that led to those boundaries in the first place. Perhaps this is a generational thing. A college student told me that he sees himself as a "citizen of the world" rather than as a citizen of the United States. I replied that if he got arrested in Singapore on a drug charge he would be wise to call the U.S. Embassy rather than the United Nations.

Those who see a seamless world filling with market-driven, benign democracies have had quite a run. Economist Paul Krugman believes (*New York Times*, Jan. 2) we are now living in an era of what he calls the "Second Global Economy" — a world economy reconstructed largely under American leadership. But he worries that the global idea is "very much a minority persuasion, all too easily portrayed as an ideology of and for a rootless cosmopolitan elite that is out of touch with ordinary people." He may be onto something. As protests at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle demonstrated, blue-collar workers see the "free trade" mantra as a cover for another kind of trade: the unrestricted import of cheap foreign-made goods without reciprocal concessions on the *sale* of U.S.-made goods abroad. The relentless U.S. trade deficit confirms the fear.

Nor is free trade restricted just to goods and raw material. Labor is now seen as fungible, human currency whose migration among nations must be unimpeded. Skilled labor has little trouble getting a green card to work in the United States. The resulting brain drain from poorer nations condemns those countries to a future as providers of plush dolls and tennis shoes. Even where unskilled, uneducated workers are concerned, the globalists are equal-opportunity employers. Cheap labor keeps inflation in check. Skilled workers fly into JFK; the uneducated cross borders in the dead of night or in cargo containers on freighters.

Eight-plus years of economic expansion mask the strategy's downside. Unless economic cycles have been repealed by Alan Greenspan and Goldman Sachs, the next recession will strew the landscape with jobless immigrant workers. Will they want to go back to the countries they fled in search of a better life? How many Americans have absorbed the fact that, due primarily to immigration, the population of the United States is projected to grow from today's 274 million to 404 million by 2050?

Not to worry, say the globalists. The Information Age is the new paradigm and will carry all problems before it. Prosperity will spread to most nations, reducing the likelihood of war. This is an old theory.

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Historian John Keegan points out *(The First World War,* 1998) that the interdependence of nations was accepted as a necessary condition of the world's life in the first years of the 20th century. The revolution in communications — by railway, telegraph and stamped postage — was seen as requiring international cooperation. Norman Angell, an advocate of economic interdependence, told a bankers' meeting in 1912 that "enlightened self-interest" was moving the world toward "a consciousness which must make for more efficient human cooperation, a better human society." European harmony would end with the guns of August 1914.

If this is a lesson of history, it is lost on some opinion-makers. In *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century* (1999), Richard Rosecrance argues that our world will become steadily more peaceful because nations will no longer need additional territory in order to thrive. And global capital markets will transfer money to poor nations. The rise of the virtual state, Rosecrance believes, will inaugurate "a new epoch of peaceful competition among nations, promising a cooperative transition to the new millennium." So much for worrywarts concerned about overpopulation, environmental degradation or the nuclear-war musings of Vladimir Putin.

Instead of waxing eloquent on the virtues of globalism, candidates for office in Election Year 2000 would better serve the public interest by addressing problems facing the sovereign nation called the United States. Urban sprawl, for example, is emerging as a major issue in the public mind. Sprawl devours the nation's countryside, and the solution will force an examination of U.S. population growth, immigration policies and environmental safeguards. And spreading contamination and depletion of major aquifers is a hidden crisis that needs addressing lest our groundwater supplies no longer support the life above for future generations. (See "Water Shock: A Global Report on Groundwater Safety," *WorldWatch,* Jan./Feb.) Not to mention global warming.

Human and ecological costs must be considered in the formation of public policy. Pie-in-the-sky globalists aside, solutions for a future that features 2 billion more human beings on the planet in the next half-century must begin at home, nation by nation. TSC

THE VILLAINY OF RAIN
by David Simcox

Once I blamed befouled waters on greedy, uncaring men.
Those that by night secrete the venoms of farm, factory, or clinic
By hidden tubes and plumes into unsuspecting streams.
But who could blame them? After all, the river does not protest its filth,
Except every decade when it regurgitates our potions back upon us.
Its usual complaints: just some mustiness and bilious greens and golds
Its carp and cats still survive the ugliest of brews.
You can even eat them — but only twice a year.
And the really dangerous stuff is headed downstream anyhow.

Harmful? My own family uses tap water to bathe and cook.
But bottled is tastier and better for drinking, you know.
We even get a laugh from the river's plight:
That glass of water drunk in Paducah
Has passed through six people since Pittsburgh.
Years back we would say four people,
But you know how the valley has grown.

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We know from Father Adam that a little greed is good for business.
Regs are the enemy of enterprise and growth,
And growth, if an illness, is its own remedy, they say.
But now I'm really confused. Reg-writing buffoons
Now proclaim another unslain demon bars us from clean streams.
Just like bureaucrats! Not enough are the treasures for sewers and treatment.
"Non-point source" is their latest way of staying funded.
Or is it? With each decade we are so many more,
Each one's trailing cloud of detritus swelling and ripening by the year.

Then who's to blame? Why, the rain of course.
Poets not technocrats can best explain its villainy,
How drops from sulfuric skies caress roads, car parks, biocided lawns,
Then by a million gradients bear tiny toxic freights to the land's veins.
Inconsiderate showers on concrete strand and asphalt steppe,
Barred from union with the filtering, cleansing earth,
Merge with the waiting broth of hydrocarbons, dust of rubber and metal,
And the lethal bile and urine of a hundred million automobiles.
Stubs of cigarettes, drinking straws, and greasy paper testaments
To larded empty calories join in the flow,
Finding anchorage in brightly cluttered rivulets and banks.

The entombed soil can give thanks its concrete carapace
Protects it from the uncaring pestilential drops.
But Earth's capillaries and streams have no such shields
Against an infinitude of watery wounds.
Man makes the once sacred river his stygian cloacal sink,
And the rains are his silent handmaidens.

I never thought of rain as paradox before: It poisons as it cleanses.
It escorts our excesses into expiatory servile rivers
Serving our swelling millions as did Aztecatlan's filth-eating gods.
Rain keeps the necrotizing ooze of richness away from our flesh,
At least for those few years until we are a hundred million more.
Then we'll be really angry at the rain.

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Puerto Rico Libre — And Good Riddance

Independence is best for both P.R. and the U.S.

by George Szamuely

President Clinton was right to offer the 16 imprisoned members of the FALN clemency. In fact, he should have gone further. He should have announced his intention of granting independence to Puerto Rico as soon as possible. The continued possession of Puerto Rico is a throwback to a colonial era that should have been abandoned long ago. Puerto Rico's bizarre "commonwealth" status is one that robs Puerto Ricans of their dignity and Americans of their dollars. Moreover, the acquisition of Puerto Rico followed one of the most shameful acts of American history — one that has particular significance today. In 1898 the United States picked a fight with Spain for no reason whatsoever. As a result of that war Spain lost its few remaining imperial possessions and with it its sense of national honor. And America abandoned its proud anti-colonial tradition and became a colonial power.

In 1895 Cuba mounted one of its periodic rebellions against Spanish rule. As the Spanish sought to restore order Americans got caught up in self-righteous frenzy. President William McKinley understandably had little enthusiasm for going to war with Spain. Spain posed no threat to the United States. It ran its empire pretty well. And if it were to be dispossessed of its colonies what was to be done with them? No American seriously believed that Cubans could govern themselves. But the shrieking Bill Kristols and David Rieffs of that time did not trouble themselves with such details. Day after day they would proclaim that American intervention was essential to prevent a great humanitarian calamity. Newspapers were filled with lurid tales of unimaginable horrors that the Spanish were perpetrating. "Massacre," "Slaughter of Innocent Noncombatants Continues in Cuba," "Bodies Thrown into Trenches and Left Unburied" were a few of the contemporary headlines. William Randolph Hearst's gutter journalism was almost as bad as Rupert Murdoch's.

To intervene was a "humanitarian" imperative. One senator declared: "We intervene not for conquest, nor for aggrandizement ... we intervene for humanity's sake ... to aid a people who have suffered every form of tyranny and who have made a desperate struggle to be free." Sound familiar? Here is what Henry Cabot Lodge had to say about Spain: it was "three hundred years behind all the rest of the world ... What seems to us brutal treachery seems to them all right." "I would like to see Spain ... swept from the face of the earth," said suffragist leader Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the Stacy Sullivan of her day. Hating the Spanish was even more fun than hating the Serbs. Catholic and obviously in decline, they were ideal material on which Americans could etch their lurid fantasies.

Though Americans fought poorly, they were fortunate that the Spanish performed even worse. The war was to have devastating consequences. Spain went from revolution to dictatorship to civil war. The Franco era brought a measure of stability but it also cut Spain off from the rest of Europe. Today the Spanish are once more in a downward spiral. For its part,

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America acquired colonies that it had no idea what to do with. Neither statehood nor independence was thinkable to the U.S. So it came up with a compromise solution: these territories would be reduced to dependencies of one sort or another of the United States.

Such a solution was to have wretched consequences for everyone else. Cuba, for instance, never really recovered from being cut off from Spain. Ask any Cuban today and he will tell you that the Spanish era was Cuba's most glorious time. Cut off from Spain and Spanish culture, Cuba never managed to develop any stable self-government. The United States arrogated to itself the right to intervene in Cuba any time it felt that American interests were endangered. It was a right that the United States was to exercise with some frequency in coming years. The story of the Philippines is just as dismal. Fighting broke out immediately between U.S. forces on the island and Filipino rebels. Soon Americans were committing the very atrocities for which they had so self-righteously denounced the Spanish. By 1901, 200,000 Filipino civilians had been killed in the fighting. Having won this war, the United States proceeded relentlessly with the Americanization of the Filipinos. The result was a disaster. Unlike other places in Asia, no sense of nationhood ever developed in the Philippines.

The United States acquired Puerto Rico without ever really intending to. Puerto Rico, impoverished and wretched, became an American possession as compensation for expenses that the U. S. incurred fighting its war with Spain. A ferocious campaign of Americanization pretty much destroyed a 400-year-old Spanish culture, but did not succeed in turning Puerto Ricans into English-speakers. The United States then decided that Puerto Rico would be denied statehood, independence or even any representation in the federal government. As part of an oppressive Spanish Empire, Puerto Rico had voting representation in both chambers of parliament in Madrid, whereas it was never to have any representation under U.S. democracy. U.S. federal laws apply to Puerto Rico and they are enforced by federal agencies. Yet Puerto Ricans have no say in the making of these laws.

"When the food stamp program was introduced in the 1960s, something like 75 percent of the island's population was eligible for food stamps. Puerto Rico received no less than 10 percent of ... payments."

Not surprisingly, Puerto Rico has become a parasite. Exempt from federal taxes, it lives off federal handouts. It survives by being able to export its population to the mainland. Puerto Rico has an unemployment rate of 13 percent (three times that on the mainland); 20 percent of its workforce is employed by the government; 30 percent of its economy derives from federal transfers. When the food stamp program was introduced in the 1960s, something like 75 percent of the island's population was eligible for food stamps. Puerto Rico received no less than 10 percent of all federal food stamp payments. The program brought billions to Puerto Rico. It fueled corruption, crime, drugs, gang warfare, as well as a culture of dependency. Puerto Ricans found that living on welfare was quite lucrative. No one felt much like working after that. Boasting poverty and hardship became a means of squeezing more money out of the U.S. Treasury.

Sadly, Puerto Ricans have become quite satisfied with their current absurd "commonwealth" status. As a U.S. state, they would no longer be exempt from federal taxes. As an independent country, they would no longer be eligible for federal handouts. This is why the time has come to do to the Puerto Ricans what grown-ups are eventually forced to do to their idle offspring: kick them out of the house. If it makes him feel any better, let Clinton apologize for a hundred years of colonialism while he is doing it. TSC

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On Teachable Moments

An illuminating exchange about immigration numbers and population growth

by Tim Aaronson

["ProjectUSA" tries to inform the public about the need for immigration reform by setting up billboards alongside congested highways with the message that uncontrolled immigration is affecting the quality of life in our country by contributing to rapid population growth with its attendant pressures on infrastructure and resources. The following exchange was prompted by a note from a teacher in Brooklyn, New York, upon seeing, along with her students, a Project USA billboard.]

Dear ProjectUSA:

We all enjoy freedom of speech in this country, but how do you explain the message presented in your billboards to a group of children whose parents or themselves are immigrants?

I am a schoolteacher who recently went out on a trip in a school bus through Brooklyn. One of my fourth graders asked me what the billboard about immigration was trying to say. As I tried to explain it to her it dawned on me that she herself, her parents, and grandparents are immigrants. I became very embarrassed and asked other students to help me explain what the billboard was saying. My students began a discussion based on the message in the billboard.

They all decided that the billboard is not helping our society. The message is creating conflict among the children of different backgrounds and hatred against a group of people. These fourth graders stated that people who see the billboard will think that immigrants are bad people and will act violently against them.

In school I asked some of my colleagues their opinion about the billboards and your web site. We would like to know what do you mean by "American people?"

According to you, who is a true "American Person?" Is it Native Americans, People from North and South America or United States citizens who entered the U.S. before 1970?

When you say that Americans have their own culture, can you describe and explain that culture? Isn't everything in this country adopted from foreign countries?

I'd like to end here and ask you to think and research why the number of immigrants is increasing so dramatically. Why does every working class person in every other country in the world dream of coming to this one for a better life? What has happened to the world that no one is happy at home? Who is truly to blame for their unhappiness?

Zulma Hernandez, 4th grade teacher.

Tim Aaronson responds:

As one who has spent his career in education, I recognize good teaching technique — in this case your seizing the "teachable moment" and discussing immigration with your students. I would also like to thank you for the tone of your inquiry. It is in stark contrast to the many who are unable to distinguish concern from hatred. I hope I succeed in convincing you that it is the former and not the latter that motivates ProjectUSA to put up billboards.

First, let me try to explain the concerns many of us have. The U.S. is growing at a staggering rate. Americans are the greatest consumers of world resources so it is particularly important that we act

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responsibly and "tighten" our population belt. At first glance there is great news — American families typically have just two children, the number needed to stabilize the population. Yet our population is growing at the rate of an India. How can that be? Most of our population growth is now due to immigration. The U.S. Census Bureau confirms this in a report issued in early January. The *Dallas Morning News* (January 14, 2000) reported this with the headline: "U.S. population projected to double in next century." The subtitle of the article reads: "Immigrants will fuel growth, Census Bureau says." The story contained a graph that shows the U.S. could reach 1.2 billion over the next century. Since the Census Bureau has often underestimated the number in the past, the prospects are truly frightening!

"What good does it do to recycle when all those efforts are wiped out by adding more and more people? Those who are genuinely concerned about America's children ... don't want to see an America of one billion people."

I am sure you teach your children about conserving resources and about recycling. Isn't it reasonable to also look at conserving our own numbers? And what good does it do to recycle when all those efforts are wiped out by adding more and more people? Those who are genuinely concerned about America's children - including your fourth graders - don't want to see an America of one billion people. There is a simple solution at hand: Reduce the current unhistorical rate of immigration to a more traditional and sustainable level. Your letter spoke of helping society. Isn't slowing the current mass immigration level an important way to help our society? It is, of course, not easy talking about this with students. It may well be embarrassing, for both immigrant child and native-born, but we do a disservice to our children if we teach them to avoid looking at difficult things. Not talking about something does not make it go away.

Now to your question, "How would I explain the message to a group of children whose parents or themselves are immigrants?" What a challenging question! Let me give you some thoughts off the top of my head. Immigration is closely tied to population issues, so I suggest you check the Zero Population Growth (ZPG) web site for some of their excellent teaching resources designed for elementary teachers. Some of their materials are free. They also conduct workshops for teachers (http://www.zpg.org).

Here are some questions I can think of that might spur some discussion:

- What would it be like if we doubled the number of students in our class; our school?
- Many farms are being turned into houses and highways as our population grows and grows. How will we feed people if we lose our farms?
- Are there any limits to the number of people who can come to our country?
- What would be more helpful to people living in other countries: inviting them to leave their country to live in America or helping them to make their own countries a better place to live?
- Would it be better to help 80 people in foreign countries or invite one person to live here? (Reflects world population growth vs. U.S. immigration numbers)
- If someone left the faucet on and our classroom was flooding and you could do only one thing — grab a mop or turn off the faucet — which would you do?
- Should people talk about things that are disturbing, e.g. immigration?

As a teacher I know the joy you must experience seeing the progress made by children recently arrived. You could not be a loving and effective teacher otherwise. Yet, let me leave you this thought to consider — in an avalanche, every beautiful snowflake pleads not guilty! TSC

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There Is No Hi-Tech Labor Shortage

Continuing efforts in Congress to extend H-1B

by Wayne Lutton

At the behest of a coalition of multinational business interests, immigration lawyers, higher education, and ethnic particularists, in February of this year Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Sen. Spencer Abraham (R-Michigan) and Rep. David Dreier (R-California) introduced versions of what they call the "American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act," to raise the annual ceiling of H-lB visas from the current 115,000 a year to 195,000 for fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002. Special exemptions for foreigners who graduate from U.S. universities with advanced degrees, or are employed by American educational institutions and research facilities, would allow a total of 300,000 to 350,000 foreign H-lB workers to enter this country every year, taking jobs that could easily be filled by American citizens.

The H-1B visa program was introduced in 1990 and permitted up to 65,000 foreigners with BA degrees or more to enter this country for up to six years to fill U.S. jobs that employers claimed they couldn't find American workers for. At the time, business and immigration lobbyists said that the program was only going to be "temporary" while American educational institutions geared up to meet special educational demands in high tech and other fields. The "temporary" program has taken on a life of its own, and the annual number of visas granted has risen from 65,000 to 115,000 to the present demands for virtually unlimited numbers of foreign professionals.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, and software industry trade groups, led by the Information Technology Association of America and American Business for Legal Immigration, claim that American high-tech firms face a skilled labor shortage of crisis proportions. Silicon Valley technology companies assert that the U.S. will go into a deep recession and transfer economic leadership overseas if they can't immediately import more foreign workers.

Upon closer examination, it is highly doubtful that a shortage in high-tech occupations exists. In a new study, *Information Technology Workforce Data Project Report*, the New York City-based United Engineering Foundation, emphasizes "there is no evidence that any serious shortages of technical professionals — engineers in the past, information technology specialists now — have ever occurred." The UEF points out those employers like the H-lB program since it helps create a large pool of available workers.

The American Engineering Association has called for the total elimination of the H-lB or any other visa category under which foreign technical workers can be imported. According to AEA, only about a fourth of Americans holding technical degrees are working in these fields. In recent testimony before the House Immigration Subcommittee, AEA Vice President Richard Tax noted that "many of these same companies asking for increased access to foreign labor have had massive layoffs in the past year." Unemployment rates among high-tech professionals are increasing. Especially hard-hit are "old timers" of 35-years of age and older. Among very experienced computer programmers over 50 years of age unemployment is currently running at a rate of 17 percent. Mr. Tax observes, "It should be noted that the American Electronics Association and the Information Technology Association of America memberships are largely transnational corporations ... transnational

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meaning 'transcending national borders' and I might add, owing allegiance to none."

Dr. Norman Matloff, professor of computer sciences at the University of California at Davis, has prepared an exhaustive report on this issue, *Debunking the Myth of a Desperate Software Labor Shortage.* Professor Matloff surveyed hiring rates at a representative sample of major software companies. He found that they are receiving huge numbers of applications from qualified job seekers, but reject most of them without even an interview. Actually, hiring rates range from 1 to 2 percent. Professor Matloff concludes, "There is no desperate shortage. The only 'shortage' is one of cheap labor ... If employers were desperate, they would certainly not be hiring just a minuscule fraction of their job applicants."

The widely advertised job opportunities in information technology have led thousands of American college students and adults looking to improve their career prospects to enroll in computer science courses. But the Department of Labor estimates that over the next few years there will be 138,000 job openings annually in information technology occupations with 162,000 students graduating each year with associate, bachelor, and graduate degrees in the related fields. Such evidence provides scant support for loud demands for more foreign high-tech personnel.

Microsoft and other members of the U.S.-based software industry simply don't want to hire American programmers if they can retain foreign workers on a rotating basis (industry surveys indicate that foreign nationals commonly earn substantially less than American citizens in the same jobs.)

"Body shops" which employ H-1B foreigners as contract laborers to American companies, appreciate the fact that aliens are bound to them for the duration of their visas. Many of the outside contractors do not pay the wages they promise and require foreign nationals to sign agreements that impose fines if the worker leaves before the end of a one-to-three-year contract.

Foreign nationals are willing to become what amounts to indentured servants for the opportunity to come to the United States. Although H-1B visas are supposed to expire after no more than six years, a majority of recipients eventually becomes naturalized citizens, with most of the rest remaining here as permanent residents.

Typically, immigration lawyers charge $2,000 to $2,500 to process each H-1B application, generating over $230 million from the current 115,000 visas available each year. It should come as no surprise that last summer, Abraham, chairman of the Senate Immigration Committee, held a $500-a-plate breakfast

"Microsoft and other members of the U.S.-based software industry simply don't want to hire American programmers if they can retain foreign workers on a rotating basis..."

at the hotel where the American Immigration Lawyers Association were holding their annual convention. Federal Election Commission reports reveal that most of the PAC money raised by the senator, currently locked in a tight reelection campaign, has come from outside his "home" state of Michigan.

The current drive to increase the number of available foreign high-tech workers is just the latest skirmish in the long-range campaign to increase profit margins for select multinational companies, in part by endangering the job prospects of American citizens. In the wake of "Free Trade" agreements, hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs have been moved overseas. Many professionals — and would-be professionals — are now also seeing foreigners take jobs that would otherwise be available to them. For those lucky enough to find skilled employment, the threat of competition from increasing numbers of foreign workers makes them less likely to demand high wage and benefit increases.

It will be interesting to see if this issue comes to the fore in the coming national elections. Americans need to take their country back from the special economic interests. We are all in this struggle together. TSC

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U.S. Immigration Policy is Stupid and Evil

by Peter Brimelow

In America we have a two-party system," a Republican congressional staffer is supposed to have told a visiting group of Russian legislators some years ago.

"There is the stupid party. And there is the evil party. I am proud to be a member of the stupid party."

He added: periodically, the two parties get together and do something that is both stupid and evil. This is called: bipartisanship."

Our current mass immigration policy is a classic example of this fatal Washington bipartisanship. It is a stupid policy because there is absolutely no reason for it — in particular, Americans as a whole are no better off economically because of mass immigration.

It is an evil policy because it second-guesses the American people, who have shown through smaller families that they want to stabilize population size.

Unfortunately, our current immigration policy is consuming the environment with urban sprawl, hurting the poor and minorities with intensified wage competition, and ultimately threatening the American nation itself — what Abraham Lincoln called "the last best hope of earth" — with cultural and linguistic fragmentation.

And, of course, the current mass immigration policy is bipartisan. Both major party leaderships have tacitly agreed to keep the subject out of politics. No single figure is more responsible for this than Sen. Spencer Abraham (R-Mich), chairman of the Senate's Immigration Subcommittee.

Abraham was a key figure in sabotaging the most recent chance of reform, the Smith-Simpson immigration bill, in 1996.

Ironically, this was a truly bipartisan measure, proposed by Republicans but based on the work of the Jordan Commission, headed by the late black liberal Democratic Congresswoman, Barbara Jordan of Texas. She recommended almost halving immigration, in part because of its impact on the poor.

The economic stupidity of current mass immigration policy is illustrated by a brilliant new book, *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy* (Princeton University Press).

The author, professor George Borjas of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, is widely regarded as the leading American immigration economist. And he is an immigrant, arriving here penniless from Castro's Cuba in 1962, when he was 12 years old.

Borjas has every reason to favor immigration. He writes movingly about his own early experiences, and compassionately about the immigrant waves that have followed him.

But, as a scholar, he recognizes what he calls "accumulating evidence" that immigration has costs as well as benefits. "My thinking on this issue has changed substantially over the years, he admits.

Professor Borjas' devastating findings:

The current wave of mass immigration is not benefitting Americans overall. "All of the available estimates suggest the annual net gain is astoundingly small," writes Professor Borjas, "...less than 0.1 percent of the Gross Domestic Product." Roughly: less than $10 billion in a $7 trillion economy.

Note carefully what Professor Borjas is saying here. Sure, those immigrants who work do raise

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overall GDP. But the bulk of that increase goes to the immigrants themselves, in the form of wages. The benefit to native-born Americans, after everything is taken into account, is infinitesimally small.

Current mass immigration is not benefitting Americans overall — but it is transforming their country. For nothing.

Least-skilled Americans are being hurt. Borjas estimates that almost half of the increased wage gap between high school dropouts and high school graduates can be attributed to immigration.

Again, note carefully what Professor Borjas is saying. Mass immigration is not making Americans richer overall. But it is, in effect, redistributing income between Americans. Specifically, because immigrants tend to be unskilled, they compete with American unskilled workers and have forced their wages down.

Of course, profits for employers of unskilled workers have gone up. But the employers' gain, according to Professor Borjas' calculations, does not cancel out the workers' loss.

And it's not just unskilled American workers. Any group of workers could be displaced. It's already happened in the computer software industry. Employers prefer to import cheap young immigrant programmers rather than retrain and pay older American programmers.

Current mass immigration is hurting key states badly. Because immigrants tend to be unskilled, and because we now have a costly social safety net, immigrants cost taxpayers money in the half-dozen states where they concentrate.

A lot of money. For example, immigration has raised the taxes of native households in California by a stunning $1,200 a year. Overall, this fiscal loss easily cancels out any small benefit immigration brings to native-born Americans.

Not only are Americans seeing their country transformed, they are actually paying for the privilege.

Oh, in case you're wondering: The amazing fact is that Borjas' views are the consensus in his profession — see the National Research Council's 1997 report, "The New Americans."

Evil? Or stupid? Either way, immigration policy is broke. And it needs fixing. Now. TSC

Life On a Thirsty Planet

Will the struggle for water trigger the next war?

PARIS, March 5 (AFP)

Water, the stuff of life, has become the source of dangerous friction, with developing nations jousting over water supplies as their populations soar and their environment deteriorates.

Ministers at the upcoming World Water Forum, meeting in the Hague on March 21 and 22, will be asked to help defuse the tensions by endorsing the idea of an international mediator in cross-border water disputes.

"Worldwide, at least 214 rivers flow through two or more countries, but no enforceable law governs the allocation and use of international waters," Sandra Postel, a senior researcher for the US-based environmental group Worldwatch Institute, points out.

According to the World Commission on Water, a 20 percent increase in fresh water will be needed by 2025, when the world's population of six billion people is expected to have increased by three billion.

Ismail Serageldin, vice president of the World Bank, made an ominous prediction in 1995: "Many of the wars of this century were about oil — but the wars of the next century will be about water."

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The biggest flashpoint is the Middle East, a region that is predominantly desert in climate, has a huge rate of population growth, shrinking aquifers and a seething tradition of strife.

Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria all draw water from the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers, while Jewish settlers and Palestinians on the West Bank are heavily dependent on the Yargon-Tanninim aquifer and two others which lie under most of the area's disputed settlements.

In Gaza, the groundwater level is reportedly sinking by 15 to 20 centimeters (six to eight inches) a year, while its quality deteriorates due to encroaching seawater.

The Golan Heights, called the Middle East's "water tower," are a crucial point in peace talks between Israel and Syria, while any final Israeli pullout from Southern Lebanon may be influenced by the loss of water drawn from the Litani River.

In Turkey, the massive Southeastern Anatolian Project's dam system will have a major impact on the Tigres and Euphrates rivers, with untold consequences for Syria and Iraq downstream.

In Asia, the Ganges is crucial to India's massive population of nearly one billion, and that of Bangladesh, while five countries in Central Asia share two rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya.

They feed the Aral Sea, which has lost half its area and three-quarters of its volume due to excessive river diversions for cotton production, stranding three million of the region's 55 million people on its dying banks.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are seeking solutions to the crisis, but no recognized treaty allocates the basin's water.

In Indochina, tension is rising along the Mekong, where dam projects in China and Laos and water diversions in Thailand will radically affect the river's ecological balance, to the probable detriment of Cambodia and Vietnam.

Around 60 million people depend on the basin below the southern Chinese province of Yunnan, and saltwater intrusion is already a serious problem in the Mekong Delta.

According to the UN Environment Program (UNEP), the need for freshwater is greater in Africa than anywhere else in the world.

"Africa has 19 of the 25 countries in the world with the highest percentage of populations without access to safe drinking water," says the agency's spokesman, Jorge Illneca.

Algeria and Tunisia are among the countries already suffering water stress, a term that applies to freshwater consumption that exceeds 10 percent of the available supply.

Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan are among eight thirsty countries drawing water from the Nile. Egypt's population of 67 million is expected to breach the 100-million mark over the next three decades. UN and independent relief officials meanwhile fear up to eight million Ethiopians may suffer hunger or starvation this year because of drought.

"Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria all draw water from the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers... Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan are among eight thirsty countries drawing water from the Nile."

Farther south, UNEP has had some success mediating water disputes in the southern Zambezi River basin and in the Lake Chad basin, according to its executive director, Klaus Toepfer.

He hopes to transform UNEP into a global moderator and mediator on water conflicts, after convincing the governments of Bolivia and Peru to sign a treaty over the disputed Lake Titicaca. TSC

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Multiculturalism, Immigration, and Aztlan

by Maria Hsia Chang

One of the standard arguments invoked by those in favor of massive immigration into the United States is that our country is founded on immigrants who have always been successfully assimilated into America's mainstream culture and society. As one commentator put it, "Assimilation evokes the misty past of Ellis Island, through which millions entered, eventually seeing their descendants become as American as George Washington."[1]

Nothing more vividly testifies against that romantic faith in America's ability to continuously assimilate new members than the events of October 16, !994 in Los Angeles. On that day, 70,000 people marched beneath "a sea of Mexican flags" protesting Proposition 187, a referendum measure that would deny many state benefits to illegal immigrants and their children. Two weeks later, more protestors marched down the street, this time carrying an American flag upside down.[2] Both protests point to a disturbing and rising phenomenon of Chicano separatism in the United States — the product of a complex of forces, among which are multiculturalism and a generous immigration policy combined with a lax border control.

The Problem

Chicanos refer to "people of Mexican descent in the United States" or "Mexican Americans in general."[3] Today, there are reasons to believe that Chicanos as a group are unlike previous immigrants in that they are more likely to remain unassimilated and unintegrated, whether by choice or circumstance — resulting in the formation of a separate quasi-nation within the United States. More than that, there are Chicano political activists who intend to marry cultural separateness with territorial and political self-determination. The more moderate among them aspire to the cultural and political autonomy of "home rule." The radicals seek nothing less than secession from the United States whether to form their own sovereign state or to reunify with Mexico. Those who desire reunification with Mexico are irredentists who seek to reclaim Mexico's "lost" territories in the American Southwest.[4] Whatever their goals, what animates all of them is the dream of Aztlan.

According to legend, Aztlan was the ancestral homeland of the Aztecs which they left in journeying southward to found Tenochtitlan, the center of their new civilization, which is today's Mexico City. Today, the "Nation of Aztlan" refers to the American southwestern states of California, Arizona, Texas, New Mexico, portions of Nevada, Utah, Colorado, which Chicano nationalists claim were stolen by the United States and must be reconquered *(Reconquista)* and reclaimed for Mexico.[5] The myth of Aztlan was revived by Chicano political activists in the 1960s as a central symbol of Chicano nationalist ideology. In 1969, at the Chicano National Liberation Youth Conference in Denver, Rodo!fo "Corky" Gonzales put forth a political document entitled El Plan de Aztlan[6] (Spiritual Plan of Aztlan). The Plan is a clarion call to Mexican-Americans to form a separate Chicano nation:

> *In the spirit of a new people that is conscious not only of its proud historical heritage, but also of the brutal "gringo" invasion of our territories, we, the Chicano inhabitants and civilizers of the northern land of Aztlan from whence came our forefathers ... declare that the call of our blood is ... our inevitable destiny.*

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...Aztlan belongs to those who plant the seeds, water the fields, and gather the crops, and not to the foreign Europeans. We do not recognize capricious frontiers on the bronze continent. ...Brotherhood unites us, and love for our brothers makes us a people whose Time has come. ...With our heart in our hands and our hands in the soil, we declare the independence of our mestizo nation. We are a bronze people with a bronze culture. Before the world, before all of North America, before all our brothers in the bronze continent, we are a nation, we are a union of free pueblos, we are Aztlan.[7]

How Chicanos are Unlike Previous Immigrants

Brent A. Nelson writing in 1994, observed that in the !980s America's Southwest had begun to be transformed into a *de facto* nation"[8] with its own culture, history, myth, geography, religion, education and language.[9] Whatever evidence there is indicates that Chicanos, as a group, are unlike previous waves of immigrants into the United States.

In the first place, many Chicanos do not consider themselves immigrants at all because their people "have been here for 450 years" before the English, French, or Dutch. Before California and the Southwest were seized by the United States, they were the lands of Spain and Mexico. As late as 1780 the Spanish crown laid claim to territories from Florida to California, and on the far side of the Mississippi up to the Great Lakes and the Rockies. Mexico held title to much of Spanish possessions in the United States until the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mexican-American war in 1848. As a consequence, Mexicans "never accepted the borders drawn up by the 1848 treaty."[10]

That history has created among Chicanos a feeling of resentment for being "a conquered people," made part of the United States against their will and by the force of arms.[11] Their resentment is amply expressed by *Voz Fronteriza,* a Chicano student publication,[12] which referred to Border Patrol officers killed in the line of duty as "pigs (*migra*)" trying to defend "the false frontier.[13]

Chicanos are also distinct from other immigrant groups because of the geographic proximity of their native country. Their physical proximity to Mexico gives Chicanos "the option of life in both Americas, in two places and in two cultures, something earlier immigrants never had." Geographic proximity and ease of transportation are augmented by the media. Radio and television keep the spoken language alive and current so that Spanish, unlike the native languages of previous immigrants into the United States, "shows no sign of fading."[14]

A result of all that is the failure by Chicanos to be fully assimilated into the larger American society and culture. As Earl Shorris, author of *Latinos: A Biography of the People*, observed: "Latinos have been more resistant to the melting pot than any other group. Their entry *en masse* into the United States will test the limits of the American experiment...."[15] The continuous influx of Mexican immigrants into the United States serves to continuously renew Chicano culture so that their sense of separateness will probably continue "far into the future...."[16]

There are other reasons for the failure of Chicano assimilation. Historically, a powerful force for assimilation was upward social mobility — immigrants into the United States became assimilated as they rose in educational achievement and income. But today's post-industrial American economy, with its narrower paths to upward mobility, is making it more difficult for certain groups to improve their socioeconomic circumstances. Unionized factory jobs, which once provided a step up for the second generation of past waves of immigrants, have been disappearing for decades.

Instead of the diamond-shaped economy of industrial America, the modern American economy is shaped like an hourglass. There is a good number of jobs for unskilled people at the bottom, a fair number of jobs for the highly educated at the top, but comparatively few jobs for those in the middle without a college education or special skills. To illustrate, a RAND Corporation study forecasts that 85 percent of California's new jobs will require post-secondary education.

For a variety of reasons, the nationwide high-school dropout rate for Hispanics (the majority of whom are Chicano) is 30 percent — three times the rate for whites and twice the rate for blacks.

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Paradoxically, the dropout rate for Hispanics born in the United States is even higher than for young immigrants. Among Chicanos, high-school dropout rates actually rise between the second and third generations.

Their low educational achievement accounts for why Chicanos as a group are poor despite being hardworking. In !996, for the first time, the Hispanic poverty rate began to exceed that of American blacks. In 1995, household income rose for every ethnic group except Hispanics, for whom it dropped 5 percent. Latinos now make up a quarter of the nation's poor people, and are more than three times as likely to be impoverished than whites. This decline in income has taken place despite high rates of labor-force participation by Latino men, and despite an emerging Latino middle class. In California, where Latinos now approach one-third of the population, their education levels are far lower than those of other immigrants, and they earn about half of what native-born Californians earn. This means that, for the first time in the history of American immigration, hard work is not leading to economic advancement because immigrants in service jobs face unrelenting labor-market pressure from more recently arrived immigrants who are eager to work for less.

"Their low educational achievement accounts for why Chicanos as a group are poor despite being hardworking."

The narrowing of the pathways of upward mobility has implications for the children of recent Mexican immigrants. Their ascent into the middle-class mainstream will likely be blocked and they will join children of earlier black and Puerto Rican migrants as part of an expanded multiethnic underclass. Whereas first generation immigrants compare their circumstances to the Mexico that they left — and thereby feel immeasurably better off — their children and grandchildren will compare themselves to other U.S. groups. Given their lower educational achievement and income, that comparison will only lead to feelings of relative deprivation and resentment. They are unlikely to be content as maids, gardeners, or fruit pickers. Many young Latinos in the second and third generations see themselves as locked in irremediable conflict with white society, and are quick to deride successful Chicano students as "wannabes." For them, to study hard is to "act white" and exhibit group disloyalty.[17]

That attitude is part of the Chicano culture of resistance — a culture that actively resists assimilation into mainstream America. That culture is created, reinforced, and maintained by radical Chicano intellectuals, politicians, and the many Chicano Studies programs in U.S. colleges and universities.

As examples, according to its editor, Elizabeth Martinez, the purpose of *Five Hundred Years of Chicano History,* a book used in over 300 schools throughout the West, is to "celebrate our resistance to being colonized and absorbed by racist empire builders." The book calls the INS and the Border Patrol "the Gestapo for Mexicans."[18] For Rodolfo Acuña, author of *Occupied America: The Chicano's Struggle Toward Liberation,* probably the most widely-assigned text in U.S. Chicano Studies programs, the Anglo-American invasion of Mexico was "as vicious as that of Hitler's invasion of Poland and other Central European nations...."[19] The book also includes a map showing "the Mexican republic" in 1822 reaching up into Kansas and Oklahoma, and including within it Utah, Nevada, and everything west and south of there. At a MEChA conference in 1996, Acuña referred to Anglos as Nazis: "Right now you are in the Nazi United States of America."[20]

The effect of books such as these is to radicalize young Chicanos. As an example, although Chicano undergraduates at Berkeley lacked any sort of strong ethnic identity before entering college, at Berkeley they became "born again" as Chicanos because of MEChA and Chicano Studies departments.[21]

The strident rhetoric of intellectuals is echoed by some Mexican-American politicians. Former California state senator Art Torres called Proposition 187 "the last gasp of white America" and spoke of "reclaiming" Southern California. The Mexican government also contributes to the Chicano sense of separateness through its recent decision that migrants

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will not forfeit their Mexican citizenship by becoming U.S. citizens and are allowed to vote in Mexican elections.[22]

Multiculturalism and Immigration

All of this is exacerbated by the U.S. government's immigration policy and a new ethic of multiculturalism that has become almost an official dogma in the mass media and in academe. Exponents of multiculturalism maintain that all cultures are equal, and that the United States must accept its destiny as a universal nation, a world nation, in which no one culture — especially European culture — will be dominant. "The ideal of multiculturalism is a nation which has no core culture, no ethnic core, no center other than a powerful state apparatus."[23]

The social ethic of multiculturalism is actively supported by an official government policy of "corporate pluralism" which militates against America's earlier ideal of assimilation. According to Gunnar Myrda!, "corporate pluralism" refers to a society where racial and ethnic entities are accorded formal recognition and standing by the state as groups in the national polity, and where political power and economic reward are based on a distributive formula that postulates group rights and defines group membership as an important factor in the outcome for individuals. By replacing individual meritocracy with group rewards, corporate pluralism "strongly discourages assimilation in the conventional sense because if a significant portion of one's rational interests are likely to be satisfied by emphasis on one's ethnicity, then one might as well stay within ethnic boundaries and at the same time enjoy the social comforts of being among people of one's own kind."[24]

Corporate pluralism is realized through such government policies as affirmative action, court-ordered busing, and bilingual education. In the case of the latter, by the late 1970s, bilingual education has become "a Hispanic institution." A bilingual establishment has been formed which "fights for jobs and perks" and is determined to maintain Spanish as both language and culture. Being supported by government laws, that establishment cannot easily be dislodged.[25]

Conclusion

Chicanos are not the only ethnic groups in the United States who resist assimilation and are geographically concentrated in certain areas and cities. The Cubans in Miami and Chinese in Monterey Park are other examples, but neither group is large enough to practice autonomism or separatism. Chicanos in the Southwest, however, are great in numbers and "are producing spokesmen for ... autonomism, separatism, and even irredentism."[26]

Since 1977, INS has apprehended over a million illegals a year, the majority Hispanics; anywhere from 2 to 5 million eluded the INS. By the early 1980s, the number of illegal aliens in the United States, mostly Hispanic, totaled 3 to 12 million. In 1980, the Census Bureau counted 14.6 million Hispanics in the United States, increasing to 15.8 million by 1982, and 17.3 million by 1985 — making America the 5th or 4th largest Spanish-speaking country in the wor!d.[27] According to the 1990 Census, Latin America accounted for 38 percent of America's foreign-born, well over half of whom were from Mexico. The real percentage is probably higher because illegal aliens avoid the census and most illegals are from Latin America.[28]

According to a report by the Urban Institute in 1984 entitled *The Fourth Wave: California's Newest Immigrants,* by the year 2000, 42 percent of Southern California's residents will be Caucasian, 41 percent Hispanic, 9 percent Asian and 8 percent black. Demographers Leon F. Bouvier and Cary B. Davis in *Immigration and the Future Racial Composition of the United States* expect that, by 2080, Hispanics (more than half Chicano) will constitute 34.1 percent of the total U.S. population, even if immigration were restricted to 2 million entrants a year from all areas of the world and birthrates of Hispanics converge with those of non-Hispanics. In 2080, Hispanics will be either a plurality or a majority of the population in California and Texas at 41.4 percent and 53.5 percent, respectively, assuming an influx of a conservative one million immigrants a year.[29]

Former Senator Eugene McCarthy, writing in 1987, had warned of a "recolonization." McCarthy's warning was sounded five years earlier by a historian of race relations, George Fredrickson. Speaking at a

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colloquium on race relations in !982, Fredrickson observed that:

> *There are two ways that you can gain territory from another group. One is by conquest. That's essentially the way we took California from Mexico and ... Texas as well. But what's going on now may well end up being a kind of recolonization of the Southwest, because the other way you can regain territory is by population infiltration and demographic dominance. ...The United States will be faced with the problem that Canada has been faced with ... and which our system is not prepared to accommodate.*[30]

Mario Barrera, a faculty member of U.C. Berkeley's Department cf Ethnic Studies, admitted that multiculturalism "would help prepare the ideological climate for an eventual campaign for ethnic regional autonomy."[31] In January 1995, El Plan de Aztlan Conference at UC Riverside resolved that "We shall overcome ... by the vote if possible and violence if necessary."[22] The rise of Mexican irredentism as a serious political movement "awaits only the demographic transformation of the Southwest."[33] As an article entitled "The Great invasion: Mexico Recovers Its Own" in a 1982 edition of *Excelsior*, Mexico's leading daily newspaper, put it:

> *The territory lost in the 19th century by ... Mexico ... seems to be restoring itself through a humble people who go on settling various zones that once were ours on the old maps. Land, under any concept of possession, ends up in the hands of those who deserve it. ...[The result of this migration is to return the land] to the jurisdiction of Mexico without the firing of a single shot.*[34]

Multiculturalism and the United States government's immigration policy have contributed toward the rise of Chicano ethnic separatism within the American Southwest that has all the makings of an incipient Nation of Aztlan. TSC

NOTES

[1] Scott McConnell, "Americans No More?" *National Review*.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) , pp.19-20.

[3] Mario Barrera, *Beyond Aztlan: Ethnic Autonomy in Comparative Perspective* (NY: Praeger, 1988), p.7.

[4] "It is not clear whether most Chicano nationalists favor independence for Aztlan itself or seek its annexation by Mexico." Brent A. Nelson, America Balkanized: Immigration's Challenge to Government (Monterey, VA: American Immigration Control Foundation, 1994), pp.31, 26.

[5] *Reconquista! The Takeover of America* (California Coalition for Immigration Reform, 1997), p.2.

[6] Barrera, *op. cit.*, p.3.

[7] http://www.aztlan.org/planaztl.html

[8] Nelson, *op. cit.*, p.27.

[9] Thomas Weyr, *Hispanic U.S.A.: Breaking the Melting Pot*, (NY: Harper & Row, 1988), p.1.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp.1, 16, 6.

[11] *Ibid.*, p.2.

[12] A publication of the Chicano movement, MEChA (*Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlan*), founded in 1969.

[13] McConnell, *op. cit.*, p.35.

[14] Weyr, *op. cit.*, p.6.

[15] McConnell, *op. cit.*, p.33.

[16] Weyr, *op. cit.*, pp.8, 5.

[17] McConnell, *op. cit.*, pp.32, 33.

[18] *Ibid.*, p.35.

[19] Nelson, *op. cit.*, p.31.

[20] McConnell, *op.cit.*, pp.33, 34.

[21] *Ibid.*, p.35.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp.34, 35.

[23] Nelson, *op. cit.*, p.110.

[24] *Ibid.*, p.12.

[25] Weyr, *op. cit.*, p.9.

[26] Nelson, *op. cit.*, p.26.

[27] Weyr, *op. cit.*, p.3.

[28] McConnell, *op. cit.*, p.32.

[29] Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp.4, 2-3.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp.1, 2.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[32] *Reconquista!*, p.1.

[33] Nelson, *op.cit.*, p.32.

[34] *Ibid.*, p.34; McConnell, *op. cit.*, p.30.

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The Dilemma of Sub-Replacement Fertility

Society faces a complex set of issues

Book Review by Craig Straub

This book would be an excellent supplement to an introductory or advanced demography course. The influence and implications of fertility, mortality and migration are succinctly applied to 21st century society. The authors approach the issues emanating from these variables from a demographic and sociological perspective — population projection data are assessed with interjection of professional opinion.

World Population: Challenges for the 21st Century
by Leon F. Bouvier and Jane T. Bertrand
New York: Seven Locks Press
185 pages, $19.75

A comprehensive overview of world population is provided in the context of demographic trends, promotion of lower fertility, and population decline. For the limitationist the resultant trends are alarming:

1) By 2030 all Americans will be minorities.
2) By 2025 the labor force in developing regions will surpass 2.7 billion causing a severe job deficit, resulting in migratory flooding of developed countries.
3) Immigration reduction is unlikely without fertility reduction in developing countries.
4) The Cairo agenda focused on gender equity rather than curbing population growth.

Bouvier and Bertrand provide conclusions for the 21st century global situation which consist of :

1) Lower fertility to keep population growth under 10 billion;
2) Drastic alteration of Western civilization by convergence of old Europe and New Asia into the United States;
3) Gradual alteration of European and Japanese ethnic composition as European civilization recedes in importance.

The authors raise critical issues related to immigration and sub-replacement fertility. However, perpetual analytical weaving with each other as demographers and sociologists results in unclear conclusions. The transition from population projection data analysis to recommendations and conclusions is difficult to follow. Many of the vital issues addressed pertaining to immigration conflict with and are omitted from the conclusions. This results in mixed signals to those who may be interested in population related issues.

The following excerpts and associated reviewer commentary are intended to provide appreciation for and qualification of the complexity and importance of population issues contained within this book.

> *Most advanced nations, particularly in Europe and Japan, cannot afford to lose population for many more decades... In our view, the solution is not to increase fertility to above replacement in the rich countries, as that would simply contribute to increased world population. Rather, continued low, near-replacement fertility; very limited and selective immigration; and increased life expectancy should be*

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encouraged in those rich countries so as to achieve zero population growth at a level agreed upon to be economically sound. (p.6)

Each country must solve its own population problem based on individual circumstances. Every sovereign nation should live within the limit of its resources and be responsible for the consequences of not doing so. Rich countries exhibiting near-replacement fertility would not be further contributing to the increase of population. Allowing immigration would contribute to above-replacement fertility and increased population which is contrary to the solution. There is no elaboration on the numbers and types of immigrants to be admitted.

...what will happen to immigration if population growth continues unabated in Central America, Asia, and Africa? It is in the best interest of all, including Americans, for fertility to be drastically reduced in all areas where it is above replacement. (p. 6-7)

The appropriate question is "How will countries with unabated population growth solve their respective problems?" Each country must resolve this question independently. The U.S. fertility level (2.05) is currently below replacement, further fertility reduction is a mechanism to allow continued levels of immigration.

Almost without exception, the world's industrialized nations exhibit below-replacement fertility. Without any immigration these nations will soon begin to lose population if they have not already done so. And what if immigration levels are maintained and possibly increased while fertility remains low? Eventually the immigrants and their descendants would become the majority in the respective host countries. How long it would take to accomplish such a goal depends on the level of fertility of both the native-born and newcomer groups, as well as the level of immigration. (p. 25-26)

The impetus for promoting sub-replacement fertility is unclear. Is it to decrease population growth (p.6) or to allow more room for immigration (p.25-26)? Who is promoting the goal of immigrants becoming the majority in host countries? The authors? Immigrant groups? Native-born Americans?

...Most pressing will be the job demands of the billions of residents of developing countries. Even in the most optimistic scenario, it appears virtually impossible to provide a sufficient number of jobs for these teeming billions. Utilization of this growing resource calls for adequate flows of capital for investment and technology transfers from the more affluent to the less affluent nations. (p.25)

"The appropriate question is 'How will countries with unabated population growth solve their respective problems?'"

This ideology follows the same premise of growing more food to feed an exploding population. Fueling the developing countries' demand for jobs is contrary to the solution of lower fertility (p.6-7). You can't cure a cancer by feeding it.

Given the population density in Europe and Japan, and given the environmental degradation and resource utilization that result from population growth and higher than average consumption, it seems that any further population growth in Europe and Japan is not only unwarranted but could be detrimental to the quality of life there. (p.27)

Despite demands by some people in the receiving countries to limit and end immigration, it is clear that some such movements should be allowed if countries like Germany and Japan are to survive. (p.32)

These two conflicting passages are one example of the mixed signals sent forth throughout the book

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regarding the population issue of immigration.

> *...It has been argued that because of American consumption behavior, the United States is the most overpopulated nation in the world. One hundred million additional Americans could prove disastrous for the environment of the planet. A number of scientists have argued quite convincingly that the population of the United States should be considerably smaller than it is today if Americans are to maintain, even remotely, their present lifestyle. (p.28)*

"Population growth diminishes any gain related to American reduction in consumption. Continued immigration exacerbates consumption by the addition of more people to the United States."

This is an excellent point which requires qualification. Population growth diminishes any gain related to American reduction in consumption. Continued immigration exacerbates consumption by the addition of more people to the United States.

> *In the United States, even if immigration ended in the year 2000, the population would continue to grow until 2050 when it would peak at 311 million. It would then fall very slowly to 298 million by 2100. (p. 30)*

The United States must be an exception to the rule of those industrialized nations which will desperately lose population without immigration as indicated on p. 25-26.

> *How much heterogeneity can these nations tolerate without changing their entire identity? When does a Turk become a German? When does a Filipino become Japanese? When does a Mexican become American? The last example is plausible in that countries like the United States have been built on immigration — they are by nature, somewhat heterogeneous, although there is some question as to how much more diversity can be tolerated. (p.35)*

Immigrants came to America because this is a great country which was abundant in natural resources and founded on enlightened principles of government.

> *However, there is compelling evidence that slightly higher fertility could be attained under certain circumstances. In recent years, Sweden and other Scandinavian countries have provided excellent examples...Research suggests that the reason could be a mixture of excellent social provisions (paid maternity and paternity leave, child care, kindergarten, comfortable housing) together with a significant degree of overall gender equality, measured, for example, in the numbers of female politicians and cabinet ministers. (p. 36)*

It is curious that this compelling evidence was not mentioned earlier in the book on pages 6 and 32 as a sub-replacement fertility alternative to immigration.

> *...The richer countries, while maintaining low fertility, should continue to accept limited numbers of immigrants under certain conditions. More important, these nations should accept the fact that in the process, their identity will change, albeit very gradually. It is relatively easy for Americans and Canadians to accept limited numbers of newcomers. Their countries are continually redefining themselves and are truly nations of immigrants...To survive as independent nations in the 21st century, receiving countries will have to adjust culturally and ethnically to an entirely new situation. (p. 48-49)*

Again, there is no elaboration on the number and types of immigrants to be accepted. It is difficult to comprehend how world population can decrease with the continued option of immigration. History and recent events reveal that multiculturalism results in chaos and violence. Compassion overtakes intellect as the authors cannot seem to accept traditional approaches to population reduction such as tighter immigration laws and enforcement of restrictions.

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The United States is probably the best example of a fairly successful program of cultural adaptation where groups of different background s— whether race, ethnicity, or religion — manage to meld into a single group (or approximately so). (p.149)

Dr. William Frey, demographer at the University of Michigan's Population Studies Center concludes that the influx of immigrants is provoking sharper racial divisions and white flight instead of greater racial and cultural mixing. George Borjas, an economist from Harvard University concludes that immigration causes native American workers to lose about $133 billion a year in depressed wages. Bouvier and Garling conducted a study which indicates that heavy immigration is closely correlated with a marked deterioration in the urban living environment.

The last point worthy of discussion and analysis is *pluralistic assimilation (p. 155)* which the authors define as the ability of all residents to maintain their own sub-cultures within America while assimilating into mainstream society. The authors suggest that this concept might be appropriate if the goal of society is to unite pluralism. This concept of multiracial groups maintaining their identities while assimilating is an oxymoron and an absolute rejection of American culture. Bouvier and Bertrand have twisted the definition of assimilation from "absorption" to "adsorption". The authors go beyond suggesting this concept by providing detailed steps required to successfully implement pluralistic assimilation. The following excerpts contain some of these steps.

...the society must provide the means to make economic and social advancement possible for all its residents. This will involve easy and inexpensive access to higher education as well as technical training. (p.156)

The American Engineering Association has been asking Congress for more than twenty years to cut the importation of engineers to allow Americans in the profession the opportunity to pursue their careers. Bouvier has concluded in the past that admission of highly educated migrants discourages native minorities, distorts the labor market and hurts developing countries through the brain drain. In addition, the job demands posed by the projected 2.7 billion people in developing regions is certain to cause difficulty for America if current U.S. immigration policy persists.

Schools at all levels should develop programs to better understand the multilingual and multicultural backgrounds of all its residents, new and old. (p.157)

"...the influx of immigrants is provoking sharper racial divisions and white flight instead of greater racial and cultural mixing."
— Demographer William Frey
University of Michigan
Population Studies Center

Under current California law, immigrant children must be taught in their native language, costing California almost $2 billion per year. New York City public schools have enrolled children from 167 countries, speaking 185 languages and dialects. The cost for bilingual instruction is $130 million per year.

The authors bring forth a comprehensive and complex set of critical issues facing society which require further inquiry and action. The interspersion of sociological implications within demographic exercises exhibited signs of obstructive empiricism which impeded the clarity and effectiveness of recommendations and conclusions. This book is an important contribution to the field of demography and highly recommended for understanding the dynamics and influence of fertility, mortality, and migration on the 21st century situation. TSC

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The Future: Is There a 'There' There?

Book Review by Ed Levy

This is an ambitious book, giving serious consideration to most of the interconnected issues relating not only to America's, but to the world's future, and offering specific, detailed, thoughtful solutions to these complex problems. But there is no hubris here, since Daleiden credits all his sources; indeed, there are over 1500 end-notes. Thus, despite impressive evidence given, copious citations and generally strong reasoning, it would seem virtually impossible for anyone (including me) to agree totally with everything Daleiden recommends; and the very comprehensiveness and necessary length of the book may discourage some readers. Therefore, although the reasoning is lucid and the writing clear enough to be a straight, continuous read, the book may be most useful as a source-reference book, because of its comprehensiveness and clarity. It is, then, an important book, one to own.

The American Dream: Can It Survive the 21st Century?
by Joseph L. Daleiden
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books
718 pages, $35.95

It is also a courageous book. Since it clearly makes no sense to identify problems (and offer solutions) if the causes are not explored and exposed, Daleiden openly identifies various problem-causers, e.g., the Pope and the Catholic Church (although other religious leaders who turn away from the ethical necessity of guarding our long-term future should also be castigated), national and trans-national businesses, the apathetic and innumerate American voters and consumers (the consumption-inducing advertising industry and growth-mad economists must take much blame), both of our major political parties, the IMF, the World Bank, the CIA, etc. And since there is plenty of guilt to go around, particularly among such well-chosen perpetrators, Daleiden's proposed reasonable solutions would tread on many toes.

This is an idealistic book, the third of a trilogy, with its two predecessors, *The Final Superstition* and *The Science of Morality*, summarized in an appendix. "The greatest good for the greatest number" as a criterion for assessing a society's success is intelligently modified by showing that larger numbers inevitably limit the amount of "good" that only a small number of us would have access to. And Daleiden just misses making explicit that the classification of "the pursuit of happiness" and its two necessary pre-conditions, life and liberty, as "unalienable rights" is normative, not descriptive, so that any government that denies its citizens these rights is sinning against the Creator. Believers in the immutable baseness of "human nature" and beneficiaries of current environmentally unsound policies will allege that the proposed solutions are unrealistic and impossible to implement. Yet, Daleiden clearly shows that, as "impossible" as some partisans would want them to seem, the modes of action, solutions, policies that Daleiden proffers *must* be implemented if our civilization and humankind are to survive with some degree of dignity intact. The questions, then, are not whether, but how to carry out recommendations similar to those which Daleiden makes — not how much doing such things will cost, but what it will cost *not* to do them.

Thus, this is also a sensible, rational, practical

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book, presenting plentiful evidence and developing and defending arguments in support of the recommendations made.

The chapter headings alone demonstrate how daunting a task Daleiden tackled and how comprehensive the text is. Separate but inter-related chapters deal with population, economics, immigration, growth, trade, poverty, education, crime, health care, taxation, ethics, defense spending, unemployment and inflation, and the plight of the less-developed countries. In each case, problems and logical fallacies are discussed and solutions are presented. This review will deal mostly with issues related to population size and immigration; and instead of waiting until the end, will comment here on what may be flaws that affect only slightly the overall high quality of the book.

Simply put, Daleiden is too nice, and thus occasionally inconsistent. I do not understand why he would lessen the impact of his own data and logic by acceding to "political correctness." For example, the first chapter presents two alternative "State of the Union" addresses that, depending on what happens between now and then, could be made by a U.S. president in 2050. One address decries that, because Congress lacked courage and foresight in the 1990s, the U.S. population had reached 500 million and was still growing, necessitating measures that would make Draco look mild. The other address celebrates the fact that the country had a population of "only" 350 million in 2040 and was steadily declining slightly each year due to measures passed by an enlightened Congress in the 1990s, so that no changes in policy needed to be made in 2050.

The question then is: would Daleiden be content if U.S. population reaches 350 million in forty years, knowing that a population of 400-500 million would be "environmentally devastating," that the sustainable carrying capacity of the U.S. is close to 150 million and that 350 million is much closer to 400 million than to 150 million? Since our current population of 275 million already does so much environmental harm, what a population continually growing more numerous over the next forty years would do to our water supply, our forests, our land, our social, cultural and political institutions hardly bears imagining. Will we suddenly start to conserve? Will the continuous influx of immigrants, even as small a number as the 250,000 Daleiden suggests, adopt the conservation-preservation ethic or American over-consumption as their life style? Daleiden should have faith in his own data and his own recommendation that the "ideal population trend would be a flat or slightly declining level in population" and recommend that this trend start now.

"Daleiden should have faith in his own data and his own recommendation that the 'ideal population trend would be a flat or slightly declining level in population' and recommend that this trend start now."

Suggesting a "slower" rate of population growth or a "lower level of immigration" may be a "realistic" way to speak to benighted Congresspersons, but it is unrealistic to believe that this continued growth will do anything but irreversible harm. Now, if this chapter had occurred later in the book, after the evidence had been presented, we might accept the idea that a U.S. population of 350 million would be the best that we could realistically hope for — given Congress's level of competence and accountability; but appearing early, it seems to be offered as a desirable goal to be energetically worked for — and it is not. Taking Daleiden's data seriously (as we should) leads to the conclusion that *now* is when our population should start decreasing, and that means a virtual cessation of immigration — now. "Modest gains in the standard of living for all Americans" is simply not "sustainable" since we already consume far too much, and adding more people simply increases the unsustainability. Lifting up our poor is not possible if we continually import more and still more poor. Forty years is too long to wait.

One other question: why should Americans lower

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their fertility rate to less than the 2.1 replacement level in order to accommodate immigrants? Why and to whom would this be fair?

Another example of inconsistency: how can our current Members of Congress be considered "neither corrupt nor even inept" and their actions seen as "merely reflecting what the majority of their constituents want" when they do "not know much about demography or economics in today's world, respond to lobbyists and big donors rather than to the large majority of America's citizens, deliberately and consistently disregard what every poll for the last two decades has shown: that most Americans want less, even substantially less immigration, flagrantly ignore easily available data, ever-present even in our newspapers, about American citizens having to deal with stagnant or declining buying power, a shrinking middle class, a steadily deteriorating environment, increased "natural" disasters, urban and suburban sprawl, failing educational systems, still too-high crime rates, a booming drug market, etc. Do all these things show honesty and aptitude? Daleiden points out that "spineless presidents and Congresspeople" valued their own political futures more than the future of America, and that "as we become more populous" Congress members become ever more inaccessible (except to big donors) so that "the ideal of a nation of the people, by the people, and for the people recedes." Would a competent and honest Congress allow immigration-driven population growth to destroy this ideal? And why don't we all realize that any immigration that causes our population to grow even a little, or even to stay at its present size rather than begin to decline immediately, works against the "sustainability" of our society?

If Daleiden is willing to criticize the Pope and the Catholic Church, why does he shy away from criticizing Congress?

Daleiden's reasonable niceness leads to some arguments taking on an apologetic tone. For example, the politically correct acknowledgment that immigrants "are making a major contribution to our society" seems to support claims that immigration's "benefits" (e.g.,"revitalizing" neighborhoods, establishing businesses and "creating" jobs, adding more consumers, like car and house buyers) outweigh its harm (on the environment, our culture, the bifurcation of our society into rich and poor, our representative form of government, increasing recognition of ethnicity and the divisiveness it causes). Rather than blunt the message about the costs of immigration, it would have been better not to have begun with a bow in their direction, and still better to have credited specific individual immigrants (e.g., Hideki Irabu or Mario Obledo) with having remarkable and unique skills that have contributed importantly to our well-being, so that these few are the exceptional individuals whom we desperately need.

"Why don't we all realize that any immigration that causes our population to grow even a little ... works against the 'sustainability' of our society?"

More important is the politically *in*correct position of egregiously conflating intelligence and education. All academics know colleagues (and students) who are stupid (i.e., unable to perceive relationships) and uneducated people who have understanding, even wisdom. The key argument is not the statistical description of what is (or seems to be), but the possibility of what *could be*, given proper opportunities. Too many poor people have babies; and neither they nor their parents have or have had choices. If we don't believe that, we cannot maintain that we should train our own unemployed or underemployed citizens; for if these citizens, who have never been allowed to play on a "level playing field," are indeed unemployable because they congenitally lack "cognitive skills," then we cannot train them because they are untrainable. Then, if we cannot find citizens who can or could do the work required, we *must* import and hire immigrants. Thus, Daleiden's acceptance of this statistical "evidence" is a positive defense of the need for immigrants. Importing immigrants and neglecting our own citizens who are perceived as too lacking in "cognitive skills"

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to be trainable would be the real way to guarantee a perpetual underclass of uneducable "losers." This is the defense of having coolies: if we can neglect a group or class of people long enough, we can build a belief system and statistical "evidence" that convinces us — and convinces them — that they are in an underclass because they are indeed inferior, were born and are meant to remain inferior. Well, *Brave New World*, here we are again.

More troublesome is the persistent use of the word "sustainable," with Daleiden's definition of it coming late in the book, so that the term can be — is being — abused. That is, if our population is already too large, if we already consume too much, if we already do too much environmental harm, then we need to implement negative population growth as soon as possible. Thus, "growth," as it is commonly understood, cannot be "sustainable" if our society and environment are to be sustained. And certainly, immigration cannot be "sustainable." While people are scuffling for a living, as almost all immigrants are, they don't care about mutated frogs or the effects of deforestation. Rather, they are eager to adopt the over-consumptive American life-style where waste is a sign of wealth and well-being. Only as they or their children become acculturated can that awareness and care begin.

Moving to a more positive vein, what I perceive as flaws are more than balanced by the book's basic and overall soundness. Examples abound.

First, Daleiden's discussions of population and immigration are, but for the exceptions taken above, excellent. And his recommendations for reducing immigration are well thought out — indeed, if they were followed we might still have a future.

Second, he even-handedly tries not to blame all our difficulties on immigration. Depressed wages, a smaller middle class, foreign investment, extraordinary expenditures on defense, excessive litigation, the rise of competition in the rest of the world, the problems associated with ghettoes, "helping" less developed countries with military aid instead of with agricultural technology and family planning advice (I would add building schools and hospitals and the granting of micro-loans to individuals rather than corrupt governments, all of which would reduce the "push" factor) are all problems that immigration and population growth contribute to but are not the sole cause.

Third, Daleiden's sane rebuttals of accepted "truths" include pointing out that "wanting more children because Mama had many" is not a biological need; that exporting jobs while importing people may be what cheap-labor advocates and investors want, but not American workers, environmentalists or those who want to preserve American culture and political practices; that the use of the GDP as a measure of our well-being makes no sense, since funding our penal system or reconstruction after "natural" disasters whose effects are made worse by human activities also boost the GDP; so-called "studies" by such think tanks as the Urban Institute are invalid because they make their "data" support what they want to find by over-estimating wages immigrants are likely to earn and under-estimating the payments to support governmental operations that immigrants will make.

Daleiden's basic message, then, is that today's acts are destroying tomorrow, that we are stealing, not just borrowing, from the future and that we must accept the possibility of disasters if we are to prevent them. The strengths of the book are impossible to list completely, but the sheer variety of examples is notable: population-induced miseries; the hypocrisy of being proud of the work one's parents did (to allow their children to avoid this work) while also believing that doing that same work would be demeaning to themselves; the need to be prudent about global warming even if we are not yet convinced about its presence; the consequences of living in or moving to places that cannot sustain life, e.g., the Ganges River delta, deserts, flood plains, earthquake and landslide zones, barrier islands, so that we are seeing an exponential rise in environmental damage throughout the world.

An additional value of the book is the validity of its arguments: e.g., the deft debunking of the "demographic transition" theory (with the addition that even if it were true, it would be too late, because of doubling time, to matter by the time it kicked in); the damage we do to less-developed countries (and to our own citizens who deserve opportunities) by pirating away their talented and trained people at the

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same time that we bring in their uneducated to compete with our citizens who are left untrained; the demonstration that what was(or may have been) true, e,g., that America can take in more people with ease or that immigration was not a problem in the 19th century, is now no longer true, so that we have to re-think our policies; and that a solely economic model, one that disregards environmental concerns, is harmful.

For those of us who are concerned about and are willing to take responsibility for the future, however, Daleiden's proposed solutions, culled from a vast array of rich sources — economists, philosophers, ecologists, etc. — are well worth implementing wherever possible. And the fact that all this copious material is collected in one place is extremely valuable. Most important of all, for me, and I wish he had emphasized this more, is his argument that "radical reforms," even a moratorium on immigration, must be sought now. The book is an information "mall" and more. We should all see more deeply the ramifications and implications of the issues Daleiden discusses and with the ideas he presents. And we should act now. TSC

How Much Does Growth Cost? Worth the Price?

Book Review by Sharon McLoe Stein

American attitudes toward growth reflect a great deal of ambivalence. Many see economic and population growth as good business, more consumers, more workers, more prosperity — a rising tide that lifts all boats. For those who directly profit, growth is an engine of expanding wealth and power, with many politicians seeing it as the ticket to re-election and just as importantly a well-funded war chest. For most others, growth is a fact of life, something to be endured, the inevitable price of progress. For most ordinary American families living in sprawl ravaged communities, however, growth has a dark underside that has, until recently, received far too little exposure.

Now, Eben Fodor, who describes himself as a "public interest community planning consultant (i.e., not a development planner)," has written a book for those who want realistic alternatives to the prospect of never-ending growth. *Better Not Bigger* is a thoroughly accessible, information-filled, action guide that definitively exposes the myth that growth is an unalloyed good. His analysis of the money, economic forces, and political alliances that drive growth clearly delineates who are the real winners and losers. As Fodor follows the money, we find that it is not the long-term well being of American communities but an unwritten and too often unexamined mantra "In Growth We Trust" that drives the local politics of growth. Whether it is community activists or the increasing number of local decision-makers who are looking to battle the powerful and well-funded development interests, this is a book that provides the answers and arguments necessary to be an effective advocate for rejecting the growth imperative and moving toward truly sustainable communities.

Better Not Bigger: How to Take Control of Urban Growth and Improve Your Community
by Eben Fodor
New Society Publishers
176 pages, $14.95

Just as growth consumes communities piece by piece, Fodor meticulously takes apart the growth machine and exposes its inner workings. At the heart

__Sharon McCloe Stein__ is executive director of Negative Population Growth (NPG). This review is reprinted, with permission, from their newsletter.

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of this machine are what he describes as the "The Twelve Big Myths of Growth." One by one, he addresses and carefully provides a detailed refutation of growth's core ideology, myths such as: "growth provides needed tax revenues, we have to grow to provide good jobs, we have to 'grow or die'."

Fodor pays special attention to one of today's most prevalent myths — that "smart" growth is the answer. If only we do a better job at planning, create some green space, revitalize the urban cores, "smart growth" can provide it all, good jobs, affordable housing, an increased quality of life and a healthy environment. He calls this "The Catch 22 of Growth: the better you make your community, the more people will want to live there, until it is no better than any other community." Far too many communities have been seduced by the belief that they can have their cake and eat it too, that they can somehow manage growth, mitigate the worst impacts of sprawl and still preserve quality of life and the environment. This book is a powerful exposition of the fundamental contradictions that underlie the rhetoric and often self-serving promises of smart growth apologists.

Much of the hard-hitting analysis on the costs of growth came from a groundbreaking study that Fodor did on the infrastructure costs to local communities of single family homes in Oregon. In what is perhaps the best in-depth examination of the costs of growth to local communities available, Fodor's detailed analysis is a virtual activist primer on determining the costs of growth to any community across the country.

This book is far more than just a critique of growth. Its greatest value is to grassroots organizers, environmentalists, and other activists who want to get involved and do something to help their local communities put the brakes on growth. Much of the latter half of the book is a detailed nuts and bolts look at what local communities can do to control and in many cases stop growth on the local level. Unlike the growth accommodation masquerading as smart growth so fashionable among some national and state political leaders, Fodor recognizes that simply making the best of a bad situation is not enough. He is keenly aware that the main battles over growth are won and lost in thousands of local communities across the nation. This book also provides the analysis, information and resources to successfully take on the growth machine.

This emphasis on the local is both a strength and weakness in the book's approach to growth issues. If there is a shortcoming, it is in a failure to put local growth control efforts in the larger context of national economic and population growth. While he details effective strategies and tactics for controlling or stopping growth on the local level, Fodor never quite comes to grips with the extent that national population growth drives both economic expansion and ultimately growth on the local level. As long as the national population keeps growing, the additional people will need jobs, houses, transportation and resources to consume. Populations may grow nationally, but they impact is most acute in the local community. No matter how well you manage, mitigate or minimize, additional humans means additional impacts on quality of life and on the environment be it locally, nationally or globally.

Likewise, Fodor never really examines how much more effective the measures he advocates would be if population growth pressures were alleviated. Good planning and design, economic and tax incentives, effective and innovative land use regulation, preserving undeveloped land, and citizen involvement are all important parts of controlling growth and moving toward sustainability. But, no matter how effective these measures are they are not by themselves sufficient for lasting gain. From a long-term perspective, the only sound foundation for ending growth is a stable and stationary national population, ideally at an optimum level much smaller than today's. *Better Not Bigger* gives much needed insights, analysis, practical tools and activist resources for those working for "smart" growth. Were these efforts combined with national efforts to lower immigration and eventually stop national population growth, the approaches presented in this book could be the basis for achieving truly livable and sustainable communities. TSC

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Privacy: A Privileged Right?

Book Review by David Simcox

Only a consummate intellectual such as Israeli-American sociologist Amitai Etzioni could argue that personal privacy has gone way too far in super- individualistic America, and be heard without jeers.

Etzioni, today's leading communitarian thinker, presents the case that the common good, a suspect value in a society that prizes autonomy, has suffered in many spheres from the enthronement of personal privacy. He admits — perhaps too cursorily — that the common good is an elusive concept: prescriptions about what the common good might require in a specific situation are usually profuse and conflicting. Most, for example, would agree that the environment is a common good that must be protected, but disagree where and how much it is threatened, and by what or whom? The current deadlock over whether there is global warming and what to do about it is another striking reminder that the common good is far from obvious. The author stresses that the common good defended in this particular book is above all the protection of public health and safety.

The Limits of Privacy
by Amitai Ezioni
New York: Basic Books
280 pages, $25.00

The author finds that privacy has become a "privileged" right, assumed to trump all others. For communitarians, however, all rights are subject to reasonable limitations in the interest of other rights of equal or greater value and of the common good. So, as his book title suggests, there must be limits on privacy rights: but how much, in what circumstances, and with what safeguards?

Etzioni offers four criteria for considering the best balance between the common good and the demands of individual privacy. He then applies those criteria in five case studies of major recent and current privacy issues: Megan's Law for disclosure of child molesters, the anonymity of HIV-infected mothers, public power to decipher encrypted private messages for crime control and security, the need for a national ID card, and the use and misuse of individual medical records.

In each of the five cases he applies his four-criteria test. First, is there a "well documented and macroscopic threat to the common good, not merely a hypothetical danger?" If so, what are the available options for dealing with that danger without first resorting to restrictions on privacy? The third criteria is: what can be done to make any needed curbs on privacy as unobtrusive as possible? And finally, what are ways to treat the undesirable side effects of the restrictions on privacy?

In the case of HIV infected mothers, Etzioni's four-point test convinces him to support mandatory testing of all newborns for the HIV virus, requiring disclosure of the results to the mothers. Existing arrangements permitting only consensual testing of infants, or "blind testing" with no disclosure of individual results, present a clear danger to the common good — the suffering and death of considerable numbers of children that their parents and society could easily avoid with proper knowledge. The author reasons that the right to life outweighs any increase in the risk of the mothers' being stigmatized and discriminated against by a fearful community, although this risk must be recognized and alleviated. His third and forth criteria require new and tighter measures to sharply restrict access to the test results to the medical professionals immediately involved and to increase the penalties for those misusing the information or discriminating against HIV-positive persons.

Looking at the state of health records, Etzioni finds a paradox in the well documented abuse of personal medical care data by the "privacy merchants"

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of the business world. Society's defenses of confidentiality are remarkably weak against private sector intrusions. But meanwhile most of the alarm and agitation over privacy loss has targeted government as the privacy-destroying Leviathan. It is "Big Brother" on the Potomac that commands the menacing network of snoops, dossier-keepers and data banks. Paradoxically, while Americans "...fear 'Big Brother' most, they need to lean on him to protect privacy better from the abuses of 'Big Bucks.'"

The case study of secure national identification cards finds, not one, but a cluster of distinct threats to the common good from the country's failure to adopt them. The tangle of issues, interests and phobias involved makes the national identification card the most heated and intractable of the five privacy issues examined. In late 1999 Congress overturned a 1996 law that would have placed federal document security standards on state-issued driver's license. A small band of libertarian congressmen had only to label federal standards a "de facto national ID card" to kill the legislation.

For a decade, privacy interests in Congress, joined by pro-business groups, have invoked similar accusations to block implementation of a nationwide system to check job applicants' eligibility to work in the U.S. The same anxious advocacies are gathering to keep the contemplated individual health care and gun owners' identification cards off the table, and to stall any efforts to make the social security card into a secure personal ID document.

For Etzioni this behavior is national negligence, and the common good is the prime victim. He sees no incompatibility between democracy and card-carrying citizens, as is evident in the well-safeguarded use of national ID cards in societies no less democratic than our own. He is not the first to argue that societies don't become totalitarian by use of ID cards; they abuse ID cards because they are totalitarian. Democracy has the adaptability to use ID cards and remain democratic.

America pays a high price for its peculiar notion of privacy. He outlines how the country's jerrybuilt system of identification prevents the detection and control of criminal fugitives, sex offenders, income tax cheats, child support deadbeats and welfare cheats, illegal gun merchants, illegal immigrants, and thieves out to steal our very identities. Reliable identification, secured by biometric identifiers, can increase, not diminish, the citizen's privacy and autonomy. As further safeguards against abuse Etzioni calls for a network of "privacy ombudsmen" and greater individual citizen involvement in the policing of others' use of his own personal data.

The book closes with an appeal for an updated, communitarian concept of privacy — a privacy that is not absolute, but varies with context. Sure to elevate the eyebrows of libertarians and civil rights advocates is his statement that the country is now in a "...new sociohistorical context [which] calls for greater dedication to the common good and less expansive privileging of individual rights."

The author is skeptical about the constitutional reasoning of the last three decades that underpins today's concept of a natural, absolute right of privacy. For him, the fourth amendment remains the proper cornerstone of American privacy law. This amendment embodies the constitution's "clear and firm foundation for acts that serve the common good and take precedence over privacy considerations by establishing a whole category of legitimate, 'reasonable' searches and seizures." Thus the fourth amendment provides a balanced, almost communitarian conception of privacy that does not privilege it.

Libertarians, seeing privacy under siege at every turn, will scoff at Etzioni's characterization of privacy rights as "privileged," and will probably regard his book itself as more evidence of the steepness of the slippery slope on which privacy is now skidding. But privacy exists as a value in an American society that is rapidly becoming something new and not necessarily more benevolent. Etzioni's perception of the changing "socioeconomic context" in which privacy must operate will indeed resonate with those aware of the prospects of steadily higher population density and resource competition, spreading technological wizardry, and the globalization of crime and terrorism. Will privacy as we know it in its current golden age be affordable or even conceivable in the super-competitive, heterogeneous market-nation of half a billion Americans looming on our horizon?

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The Bulletin Board

Immigration on the Internet

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT journal now has a research site by which all the articles published in previous issues of the journal are available at <thesocialcontract.com>.

Here are some other sites that readers may find of interest. By listing them here *The Social Contract* does not imply an endorsement of all the material on any specific site.

- The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) <fairus.org>.
- "Immigration by the Numbers" <numbersusa.com>.
- English Language Advocates <elausa.org>.
- Affirmative Action for Immigrants <pw2.netcom.com/~jimrobb>.
- Peter Brimelow, Scott McConnell, et al, <www.vdare.com>.
- News and commentary on ethnic and other conflicts worldwide <antiwar.com>.
- Carrying Capacity Network <carryingcapacity.org>.
- Negative Population Growth <www.npg.org>.
- Philip Martin's *Migration News* <migration.ucdavis.edu>.
- Professor Norman Matloff: <heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/pub/Immigration/Index/html>.
- Midwest Coalition for Responsible Immigration <enteract.com/~mcri97>.
- Sierrans for US Population Stabilization <susps.org>.
- A parody site: <sierraclubbed.com>
- *People and Place* is published in Australia by the Centre for Population and Urban Research <elecpress.monash.edu.au/pnp>.
- Canadian Immigration Reform Committee <canadafirst.net>.
- Voices of Citizens Together <americanpatrol.com>.
- Council of Conservative Citizens <cofcc.org>.
- Columnist Samuel Francis <www.samfrancis.net>.
- The Biocentric Institute <ultralink/net/IAPM>.
- "Stalking the Wild Taboo" <lrainc.com/swtaboo/>.
- Projects USA <projectsusa.org>.
- The European Forum for Migration Studies <www.uni-bamberg.de/efms>
- Floridians for a Sustainable Population <flsuspop.org/index.htm>.
- Population and Sustainability <www.ecofuture.org/ecofuture/populat.html.>
- American Renaissance <amren.com>.
- *Mankind Quarterly, The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* — articles and reviews including population, immigration and public policy: <mankind.org>.
- Federal Publications (developments in immigration law) <fedpub.com/immigration>.

E-mail addresses for pertinent organizations:

- <center@cis.org> Center for Immigration Studies (CIS).
- <npg@npg.org> Negative Population Growth.
- <ccn@igc.apc.org> Carrying Capacity Network (CCN).
- <caps@calweb.com> Californians for Population Stabilization (CAPS).
- <newsclips-subscribe@egroups.com> Conservative News Links.

And from the perspective of the opposition and their stand for open borders:

- The American Immigration Lawyers Association <aila.org/home.htm>.
- The Sierra Club <sierraclub.org>.
- The Aztlan Organization <aztlan.org>.
- Political Ecology Group (PEG) <igc.org/peg>.

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

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The American Dream:
Can It Survive the 21st Century?

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